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INTRODUCTION
In June 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.' The case involved a claim for compensation
against the State of South Carolina by a landowner who was prohibited from
placing structures on two of his beachfront lots.' The Court declared that the
landowners must be compensated when government regulations deprive them
of all economically beneficial or productive uses of their property3 unless the
proscribed uses were not permitted as part of their original titles.'
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Id. at 2887.
3. Id. at 2895 ("[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all eco-
nomically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking.").
4. Id. at 2899 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economi-
cally beneficial use, we think that it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with.").
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Although some legal commentators have praised the Lucas decision,5
others have strongly condemned it.6 A common criticism of Lucas is that
will have a detrimental effect on wetland protection programs.7 Indeed,
the Lucas Court itself observed that wetland regulations might give rise to
takings claims by affected landowners. 8 This Article, however, takes a
somewhat more benign view of the Lucas decision. No doubt Lucas will
force governments to compensate property owners when wetland regula-
tions strip the land of all economic value; but in such cases, the govern-
ment ought to pay. On the other hand, Lucas does not pose much of a
threat to wetland protection regulations that recognize the interests of
landowners as well as the needs of the environment.
Part I of this Article looks at the nature of wetlands, their environ-
mental and social value, and the extent to which they are being harmed by
human activities. Part II examines existing wetland protection statutes,
5. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Wild Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the
Lucas Decision on Shoreline Protection Programs, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 438 (1993) ("The
categorical takings rule set forth by the majority in Lucas is analytically sound and fully con-
sistent with the true meaning of the Takings Clause."); Michael J. Quinlan, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: Just Compensation and Environmental Regulation-Establishing a
Beach Head Against Evisceration of Private Property Rights, 12 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
173, 185-86 (1994) ("Although the Court in Lucas did not clear up the confusion surrounding
the regulatory takings doctrine, it properly rejected South Carolina's proffered police powers
argument."); Kent A. Meyerhoff, Note, Regulatory Takings-Winds of Change Blow Along the
South Carolina Coast: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 72 NEB. L. REV. 627, 640
(1993) ("In establishing a new per se takings rule premised on preventing deprivation of all eco-
nomically beneficial uses and in establishing a public nuisance standard for evaluating regula-
tions, the Supreme Court has taken a positive step toward ensuring that oppressive regulations
that strip property owners of all of their rights will not be enforced without compensation.").
6. See William W. Fisher I1, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1410 (1993)
("[Tihe ruling in Lucas is not a step in the right direction."); John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds
of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1993) ("[O]ne possible effect of
Lucas may be to stunt, if not arrest, the evolution of statutory protections from nuisance-like and
other detrimental uses of land."); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v. South Car-
olina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439,
456 (1993) ("The precedential value of Lucas is undercut by numerous analytical contradictions and
inconsistencies."); Marshall C. Cook, Casenote, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Low Tide
for the Takings Clause, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1993) ("The Court's per se rule in this area
is flawed because it does not accomplish any other results than those available under the old ad hoc
analysis, creates a per se rule more complicated than the ad hoc inquiry, and may inhibit legislatures
from passing needed regulations in the future.").
7. See Jan Goldman-Carter, Protecting Wetlands and Reasonable Investment-Backed Expecta-
tions in the Wake ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 425, 438
(1993) (denial of dredge and fill permits by the Corps based on significant degradation grounds raises
the risk of a total taking); John A. Humbach, What Is Behind the "Property Rights" Debate?, 10 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 38 (1993) (The no economically viable use theory of Lucas presents a danger to
our natural landbase because many important landforms, such as wetlands, have essentially no eco-
nomically viable use in terms of current commercial values.).
8. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
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with particular emphasis on the federal dredge and fill permit program
administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Part III explores
takings law prior to Lucas and discusses some representative cases involv-
ing wetland protection regulations. Part IV evaluates the Lucas decision
and some post-Lucas cases involving wetlands. Finally, Part V analyzes
the number of issues raised by Lucas and its progeny. Based on a prelimi-
nary assessment of these cases, the author concludes that Lucas will not
adversely affect the enforcement of most wetland protection regulations.
I. WETLANDS
Wetlands constitute about five percent of the land area of the lower
forty-eight states.9 Although they are an essential resource, wetlands are
disappearing at an alarming rate as the result of dredging, filling, drain-
age, and other human activities. °
A. Wetland Characteristics
Wetlands are transitional areas, lying between identifiable bodies of
water and dry land." Most scientists agree that wetland areas are charac-
terized by the presence of: (1) hydric soils, 2 which are typically saturated
with water during much of the growing season; (2) hydrophytic vegeta-
tion, 13 which is adapted to or tolerant of saturated soils; and (3) sufficient
9. Office of Technology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulation 3 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Use and Regulation]. In a recent study, the Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that there were
103.3 million acres of wetlands in the contiguous United States. This study classified 97.8 million
acres as freshwater (or inland) wetlands; the remaining 5-5 million acres were categorized as estuarine
(or coastal) wetlands. See Thomas E. Dahl and Craig E. Johnson, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Status and
Trends of Wetlands in the Coterminous United States: Mid-1970's to mid-1980's (1991) [hereinafter
Status and Trends]. An additional 200 million acres of wetlands are located in Alaska. See Sherry L.
Jacobs, Comment, Strengthening Wetland Protection Through State Regulation, 21 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 227, 228 (1987).
10. See Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The United States Caims Court's New
Analysis of Section 404 Takings Orallenges, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, 322 (1992) (Wetlands are an
endangered natural resource, disappearing at a rate of more than 300,000 acres per year.).
11. See Michael Williams, Wetlands: A Threatened Landscape 7-9 (1990). See also Lee E.
Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 455 (1977).
12. Hydric soils are "soils that are saturated, flooded, or ponded long enough during the
growing season to develop anaerobic conditions in the upper part." See FISH AND WILDLIFE SER-
VICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, & SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, FED-
ERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTI-YING AND DELINEATING JuRISDIC'IONAL WETANDS § 2.6 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 FEDERAL MANUAL].
13. Hydrophytic vegetation refers to "macrophytic plant life growing in water, soil or on a
substrate that is at least periodically deficient in oxygen as a result of excessive water content." See
1989 FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 12. § 2.1.
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water to support such vegetation. 4 The Fish and Wildlife Service has di-
vided wetlands and associated deepwater habitats into five ecological sys-
tems: (1) marine, (2) estuarine, (3) riverine, (4) lacustrine, and (5)
palustrine. 5 Wetlands can be further classified according to their domi-
nant vegetation. For example, forested wetlands are characterized by trees
more than twenty feet high, emergent plants 6 that are tolerant of saturated
soils predominate in emergent wetlands; while shrub wetlands are domi-
nated by woody plants less than twenty feet high.'7
The Marine System generally consists of open ocean and its associat-
ed coastline.'" It is mostly a deepwater habitat, 9 with marine wetlands
limited to intertidal areas like beaches, rocky shores and coral reefs." The
Estuarine System includes tidal marshes, mangrove swamps, and intertidal
flats, as well as deepwater bays, sounds and coastal rivers. 2' Estuarine
emergent wetlands, which are characterized by grass or grasslike plants,
can be divided into "salt marshes" and "brackish tidal marshes."' Salt
marshes are flooded by tides for varying periods depending on elevation
and tidal amplitude.' They are usually located behind barrier islands and
beaches in relatively high salinity waters. Brackish tidal marshes are
commonly found in coastal rivers where seawater is diluted by fresh wa-
ter.' Intertidal flats lie seaward of tidal marshes and mangroves, at river
14. See John G. Lyon, PRACnCAL HANDBOOK FOR WEnAND IDENTIFCATON AND DELNEAnON 20,24
(1993). See also Denis C. Swords, The Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act
of 1991: A Restructuring of Section 404 that Affords Inadequate Protection for Critical Wetlands, 53
LA. L. REV. 163, 174 (1992). Wetlands do not necessarily have to be covered with water, even tem-
porarily; it is sufficient that enough water is present to saturate the soil. See Wetlands Conservation,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Seas. 639 (1991) (statement of
Prof. Francis C. Golet, Univ. of R.I. Dep't of Natural Resources Science).
15. See U.S. FISH AND WtIDLE SERVICE, WELANDS OF ThE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND
RECENT TRENDS 5 (1984) [hereinafter CURRENT STATUS].
16. See Elinor L. Horwitz, COUNCILON ENVIRONMENTALQUALITY, OUR NATION'SWETLANDS 6
(1978) [hereinafter OUR NATION'S WETLANDS]. Emergent vegetation refers to plants that are rooted in the
soil but thrust through the surface of the water. Id.
17. See STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 9, at 18.
18. See STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 9, at 17.
19. Deepwater habitats are "environments where surface water is permanent and often deep, so
that water, rather than air, is the principal medium within which the dominant organisms live." See
STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 9, at 18.
20. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 5, at 5. The Fish and Wildlife Service's classification sys-
tem includes nonvegetated wetlands. See FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 12, at 3.
21. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 15, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 6. Cordgrass and marsh hay are the prevailing forms of vegetation in East Coast salt
marshes, while glasswort and a different species of cordgrass predominate on the West Coast. See
OUR NATION'S WETLANDS, supra note 16, at 8.
24. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 15, at 6.
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mouths or along rocky coasts.2 Estuarine shrub wetlands are character-
ized by salt-tolerant woody vegetation less than 20 feet in height.' Man-
grove swamps, which are found along the southern Florida coastline, are
illustrative of estuarine shrub wetlands.27
The Riverine System is limited to freshwater river and stream channels
and is mainly a deepwater habitat system.2" The Lacustrine System, which is
also a deepwater system, includes lakes, reservoirs and deep ponds.29 The
Palustrine System encompasses the vast majority of the country's inland
marshes, bogs and swamps.3" Palustrine forested wetlands contain trees taller
than 20 feet.3' These wetlands are commonly found along the floodplains of
rivers, where they are referred to as "bottomland hardwood forests" or
"bottomland hardwood swamps."3 2 Palustrine emergent wetlands are domi-
nated by grasses, rushes and sedges.33 These wetlands are called marshes,
wet meadows, fens or inland salt marshes, depending on the region of the
country and the particular characteristics of the wetland area. 3' Palustrine
shrub wetlands, known as bogs, pocosins, shrub-carrs or shrub swamps, are
dominated by woody vegetation 35
B. Social and Environmental Value of Wetlands
Until recently, wetlands were considered to be unproductive, and
even hazardous, when left in their natural state.36 Consequently, during
the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, both federal37 and
25. Id. at 7-8.
26. Id. at 8-9.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 11.
32. 1 D.D. Hook, THE ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WErLANDS214 (1988). See also WilIiam
Odum, Non-Tidal Freshwater Wetlands in Virginia, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 421, 426 (1988). In
the northern United States, tamarack, white cedar, black spruce, balsam, red maple, and black ash are
commonly found in wooded swamps. In the South, water oak, white oak, tupelo gum, swamp black
gum and cypress are dominant. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 30.
33. See OUR NATION'S WETLANDS, supra note 16, at 10.
34. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 15, at 9.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Williams, supra note 11, at 2. See also Steven L. Dickerson, The Evolving Federal Wetlands
Program, 44 Sw. L. J. 1473-74 (1991) ("Wetlands have historically been regarded as wastelands, fit only
for the breeding of mosquitoes. flies, and snakes."); Joan M. Ferrett, Restoring the Nation's Wetlands: Can
the Clean Water Act's Dredge and Fill Guidelines Do the Job?, 1 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 105-06 (1983)
(In the past, wetlands were seen as unproductive until drained or filled.).
37. See Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy and the
Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 877 (1993) (Congressional
policy encouraged the draining and filling of wetlands); Kenneth E. Varns, Note, United States v.
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state38 governments encouraged the sale and reclamation of wetlands so
that they could be converted to more productive uses. Of course, it is
now known that wetlands significantly contribute to the maintenance and
wellbeing of many aquatic ecosystems.' For example, wetlands provide
food resources and habitat for fish and wildlife.' They also help to main-
tain the integrity of watersheds by mitigating the effect of floods, by
controlling erosion and by purifying the water. 4'
Wetlands also serve as food sources and spawning grounds for many
of the fish and shellfish that are harvested along the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts.42 Numerous species of Pacific coast commercial fish and shell-
fish, 43 as well as many freshwater species' depend upon wetlands as well.
Larkins: Conflict Between Wetland Protection and Agriculture: Exploration of the Farming Exception
to the Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Requirements, 35 S.D. L. REV. 272, 278 (1990) (Na-
tional policy up to late 1960's was to reclaim land by draining and filling as much wetland area as
possible.). For example, the Swamp Lands Acts, 9 Stat. 352 (1849), 9 Stat. 519 (1850), 12 Stat. 3
(1860), granted nearly 65 million acres of federal public domain land to the states. See Michael C.
Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program Enters Its Adolescence: An Institutional
and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 409, 412 n.10 (1980). The states were supposed to
reclaim these wetlands by constructing levees and drains in order to encourage settlement and agricul-
tural development. See S. Wesley Woolf & James E. Kundell, Georgia's Wetlands: Values, Trends,
and Legal Status, 41 MERCER L. REV. 791, 807-08 (1990).
38. See, e.g., Mark J. Hanson, Damming Agricultural Draining: The Effect of Wetland Preservation
and Federal Regulation on Agricultural Drainage in Minnesota, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 135, 138-43
(1987) (describing state efforts in Minnesota to drain wetlands for conversion to agricultural use); Cheryl L.
Jamieson, Protection of the Everglades Ecosystem: A Legal Analysis, 6 PACE ENV'rL. L. REV. 23, 27-28
(1988) (discussing efforts by the state of Florida to drain the Everglades); David A. Rice, Etuarine Lands
of North Carolina: Legal Aspect of Ownership, Use and Control, 46 N.C. L. REV. 779, 787-95 (1968) (dis-
cussing North Carolina statutes that authorized the sale of state-owned wetlands to private developers).
39. See Hook, supra note 32, at 7-8. See also Hanley, supra note 10, at 317, 322 ("Wetlands
are valuable both for their intrinsic qualities and their ecological functions."). Id.
40. See Hook, supra note 32, at 213, 239. See also V. Donald Hilley, Note, The Warren S.
Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984: Enough Protection?, 9 NOVA L.J. 141, 141-42 (1984).
41. 2 Hook, supra note 32, at 52-53. See also Joseph A. Hedal, Note, The Clean Water
Act-More Section 404: The Supreme Court Gets Its Feet Wet, 65 B.U. L. REV. 995, 996 (1985).
42. See Coastal Zone Management: Hearing Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transport of the Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 38 (1987) (statement of Dr.
Donald F. Boesch, Exec. Dir., La. University Marine Consortium) (Seventy percent of our nation's fisher-
ies are dependent on estuaries for part of their life cycle); Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone Management
Act and the Takings Clause in the 1990's: Making the Case for Federal Land Use to Preserve Coastal
Areas, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 711,712 (1991) (Seventy percent of U.S. commercial fisheries catch consists of
species that are dependent upon estuarine environments during their life cycles.).
43. See OUR NATION'S WETLANDS, supra note 16, at2; William L. Want, Federal Wetlands Law:
The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).
44. Forrest Steams, Management Potential: Summary and Recommendations, in FRESHWATER
WETLANDS: ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND MANAGEMENT POTENrTAL 360 (Ralph E. Good et al eds. 1978). See
also Odum, supra note 32, at 421, 431 (many freshwater fish species spawn in wetlands or depend on
them for food); Bhavani P. Nerikar, Comment, This Wetland Is Your Land, This Wetland Is My
Land: Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Its Impact on the Private Development of Wetlands, 4
ADMIN. L.J. 197, 203 (1990) (almost all freshwater fish are dependent on wetlands).
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Wetlands also provide nesting, feeding, and resting sites for waterfowl
and migratory birds.45 For example, ducks and geese breed in the
wetlands of the prairie pothole region of Nebraska:6 and rely on wetlands
in all parts of the country for feeding and cover during migration and
overwintering periods. 47 In addition, game birds, such as grouse, partridg-
es, pheasants, doves, snipes, woodcocks and wild turkeys ,4  and many
other animals depend heavily upon wetlands for their survival.49
Wetlands contribute to water quality by capturing upland runoff and
filtering nutrients, waste, and sediment.5" When nutrient-rich waters flow
into wetlands, nutrients are taken up by growing plants5 or stored within
wetland soils2 Wetlands also remove heavy metals from water by trap-
ping them in sediment.53 Finally, sediment from upland runoff is trapped
and held in place by wetland vegetation.'
45. See OUR NATION'S WETLANDS supra note 16, at 21-22; Kevin O'Hagan, Comment, Pumping
with Intent to Kill: Evading Wetlands Jurisdiction Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Through
Draining, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1991) (wetlands serve as nesting, feeding and resting areas
for many species of waterfowl and migratory birds).
46. See Milton W. Weller, Management of Freshwater Marshes for Wildlife, in WETLANDS ECO-
LOGICAL PROCESSES AND MANAGEMENT POTENTIAL267 (Ralph E. Good et al eds. 1978). See also Stewart
L. Hofer, Comment, Federal Regulation of Agricultural Drainage Activity in the Prairie Potholes:
The Effect of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the Swampbuster Provisions of the 1985 Farm
Bill, 33 S.D. L. REV. 511, 526 (1987).
47. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 52. For example, an estimated one million ducks and
half a million geese winter in the Chesapeake Bay marshes each year. See Denis Binder, Taking Versus
Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetland, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1,
22 (1972). Large numbers of ducks and geese also overwinter in Louisiana marshes. See Oliver A. Houck,
Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 88-89 (1983).
48. See generally 0. STEPANEK, BIRDS OF HEATH AND MARSHLAND (1962). See also Binder, supra
note 47, at 23 n.173.
49. HOOK, supra note 32, at 183-226. See also Ferretti, supra note 36, at 106 (wetlands pro-
vide nesting, breeding and feeding grounds for a wide variety of mammals, birds, reptiles and am-
phibians); Mary K. McCurdy, Application of the Public Trust: Public Trust Protection for Wetlands,
19 ENVTL. L. 683, 696 (1989) (mammals and reptiles use wetlands for feeding, drinking and habitat).
50. See ANNE D. MARBLE, A GUIDE TO WETLAND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN, 31-66 (1992). See also
Woolf & Kundell, supra note 37, at 793 (wetlands filter nutrients, wastes and sediment from upland
runoff); Nerikar, supra note 44, at 207 (wetlands remove nutrients from water).
51. See HOOK, supra note 32, at 373-75. See also Houck, supra note 47, at 78 (marsh organ-
isms convert nutrients into new life at bottom of new food chains); Jeter M. Watson & Richard H.
Sedgley, Land Use Regulation by the Virginia Marine Resources Commission: The Virginia Wetlands
Act and Coastal Primary Sand Dune Protection Act, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 381, 385 (1988)
(wetland plants absorb nutrients).
52. See HOOK, supra note 32, at 307. See also Odum, supra note 32, at 433 (wetlands store
nutrients within their soils).
53. See Wetlands Conservation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1989) (statement of Janice L. Goldman-Carter, Counsel, Fisheries and Wildlife
Division, National Wildlife Federation). Heavy metal removal efficiencies vary from 20 percent to
100 percent, depending on the metals involved and the physical and biological variations that exist in
wetland habitats. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 49.
54. See 2 HOOK, supra note 32, at 140. See also Watson & Sedgley, supra note 51, at 386 (de-
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Wetlands also store and release flood waters. 55 The soil of freshwa-
ter wetlands absorbs large amounts of water during overflow conditions 6
and wetland vegetation reduces floodpeaks downstream by slowing the
velocity of floodwaters ." Coastal wetlands absorb some of the force of
ocean storms,58 thereby reducing damage to buildings and other structures
near the seashore. 59
Finally, wetlands provide significant recreational, scientific, and
aesthetic benefits.' Recreational activities include hunting, fishing,
birdwatching, boating, photography and hiking.6 In addition, a variety of
natural products, including timber, peat, cranberries and blueberries, and
wild rice, can be harvested from wetlands.62
C. Destruction of Wetland Habitats
Almost half of America's original wetlands have disappeared.' Al-
though this rate has lessened in recent years because of protective legisla-
tion,' at least 300,000 acres of wetlands are destroyed in the United States
scribing the process of sediment removal by wetland vegetation); O'Hagan, supra note 45, at 1065
(wetlands trap sediment in their vegetation).
55. See HOOK, supra note 32, at 44-45. See also O'Hagen, supra note 45, at 1064 (wetlands
affect the storage and discharge of flood waters).
56. See HOOK, supra note 32, at 136. See also Binder, supra note 47, at 18-19 (wetlands ab-
sorb vast quantities of water from overflowing rivers); Houck, supra note 32, at 76 (a 10-acre
wetland can hold 1.5 million gallons of water); McCurdy, supra note 49, at 697 (wetlands store and
slow water, thereby reducing flood peaks).
57. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at44; Nerikar, supra note 44, at 207 n.57 (wetland
vegetation reduces velocity of flood water flow downstream).
58. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 46 (wetlands protect against shoreline erosion).
59. D. F. WHlGHAM Er AL., WEILAND EQCLOWY AND MANAGEmENr CAsF STUDIES 64-65 (1990). See
also Nerikar, supra note 44, at 206 (coastal wetlands help to protect structures from storm damage).
60. LYON, supra note 14, at 2. See also Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated
Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1993).
61. JANEr LYONS & SANDRA JORDAN, WALKING THE WETLANDS 171 (1989). See also Hope Babcock,
Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to Its Ears in Alligators, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 309
(1991) (wetlands provide valuable recreational opportunities such as birdwatching, canoeing, hunting
and fishing); Hofer, supra note 46, at 527 (wetlands support such recreational activities as hunting,
fishing, hiking, camping, birdwatching, nature study and photography).
62. LYONS & JORDAN, supra note 61, at 26-89. See also Woolf & Kundell, supra note 37, 797
(wetlands provide a variety of harvestable natural products).
63. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 297. See also Simeon D. Rapoport, The Taking of Wetlands
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 ENVTL. L. 111. 112 (1986) (almost half of U.S.
wetlands have been destroyed). According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, twenty-two states have
lost 50 percent or more of their original wetlands since the 1780's. See STATUS AND TRENDS. supra note
9, at 3. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. at 2.
64. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 328. See also McCurdy, supra note 49, at 698-99.
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each year. 65 Agricultural conversion has caused most inland wetlands losses,'
while dredging for marinas, canals, and port development is primarily re-
sponsible for the destruction of estuarine wetlands.67
This destruction of wetland areas imposes a number of economic
and environmental costs on society. For example, loss of coastal
marshlands decreases the yield from commercial and recreational
fishing.6" Wetlands drainage and filling also destroys wildlife habitats69
and increases water pollution by channeling sediment and nutrients
into streams, lakes, rivers and estuaries.7° Finally, loss of wetlands in
floodplain areas aggravates flood damage by increasing the quantity
and velocity of downstream flow.71
II. STATE AND FEDERAL WETLAND PROTECTION LEGISLATION
Since the 1960's a great many states have enacted legislation to
regulate developments in wetland areas. The federal government, through
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, also protects wetlands through its
dredge and fill permit program.
65. See Wetlands Conservation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991) (wetland losses are running at 300,000 to 450,000 acres per
year) (statement of Ralph Morgenwerk, Asst. Director of Fish and Wildlife Enhancement, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife service); CURRENT STATUS, supra note 15, at 31 (wetlands are disappearing at
the rate of 400,000 acres per year); Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands
Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension,
and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 698 (1989) (wetlands losses are estimated at
300,000 to 500,000 acres annually); Kerry T. Scarlott, Note, Federal Regulation of Wetlands
and the Public Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: The Case for Insulating Wetlands
Against Regulatory Takings Challenges, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 917, 944 (1993) (approximately
300,000 acres of wetlands disappear annually).
66. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 170; James T.B. Tripp & Michael Herz, Wetland
Preservation and Restoration: Changing Federal Priorities, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 221, 221 n.2
(1988). A recent update concluded that agricultural conversion still account for 54% of wetland loss-
es. See STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 9, at 2; Joseph G. Theis, Wetlands Loss and Agriculture: The
Failed Federal Regulation of Farming Activities under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 9 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991).
67. See USE AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 7.
68. See Monica K. Kalo & Joseph J. Kalo, The Battle to Preserve North Carolina's
Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims to Estuarine Marshes, Denial of
Permits to Fill, and the Public Trust, 64 N.C. L. REV. 565, 567 (1986). Cf. WHIGHAM, supra
note 59, at 55-61.
69. See WHIGHAM, supra note 59, at 68. See also Goldman-Carter, supra note 7, at 451-52.
70. See WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 302. See also Goldman-Carter, supra note 7, at 450.
71. See CURRENT STATUS, supra note 15, at 21. See also Woolf & Kundell, supra note 37, at 796.
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A. State Legislation
In 1963, Massachusetts became the first state to implement a regula-
tory scheme specifically aimed at wetlands protection.' Since that time
many other states have enacted wetlands protection legislation.73 These
statutes vary considerably in terms of regulatory scope and purpose.
Many states have enacted legislation specifically to protect estuarine or
coastal wetlands,74 while other states include coastal wetland protection in
comprehensive shoreline management programs." A number of states
have also enacted legislation to protect freshwater wetlands76 and some
states regulate both coastal and inland wetlands under the same statutory
framework.' Finally, a few states protect wetlands under broad land use
or environmental protection statutes.78
72. See OUR NATION'S WETLANDS, supra note 16, at 53.
73. See WLLiAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGUILATION §§ 13.01-.02 (1994). For a discussion
of specific state wetland protection statutes see generally Gregory W. Blount, From Marshes to
Mountains: Wetlands Come Under State Regulation, 41 MERCER L. REV. 865 (1990) (Georgia); Jerry
F. English & John J. Sarno, Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act: Give and 'Take" in New Jersey, 12
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249 (1989) (New Jersey); David C. Forsberg, Minnesota Wetlands Conservation
Act of 1991: Balancing Public and Private Interests, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1021 (1992) (Minne-
sota); Kalo & Kalo, supra note 68, at 565; Richard H. McNeer. Nontidal Wetlands Protection in
Maryland and Virginia, 51 MD. L. REV. 105 (1992) (Maryland & Virginia); Mary F. Smallwood,
Silvia M. Alderman & Martin R. Dix, The Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984: A
Primer, I J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 211 (1985) (Florida); Watson & Sedgley, supra note 51, at 381
(Virginia); Woolf & Kundell, supra note 37, at 791 (Georgia).
74. See, e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-28 to 28a-35 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit 7, §§ 6601 to 6620 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-280 to 12-5-297 (1992); MD. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 9-603 (1990 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 49-27-69
(1988 &Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A1 to 13:9A10 (West 1991); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW
§§ 25-0101 to 25-0601 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-229 to 113-230
(1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 196.800 to 196.900 (1993 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE §§ 28.2-1300 to 28.2-
1320 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994).
75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 9-7-1 to 9-7-20 (1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.010 to 46.40.210
(1991 & Supp. 1994); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000 to 30900 (1986 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 205A-1 to 205A-49 (1985 & Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 49 §§ 214.1 to 214.41
(West Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.010 to 90.58.930 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
76. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-36 to 22a-45 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); MD.
NAT. RES. CODE §§ 8-1201 to 8-1211 (1990 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.901 to
281.966 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.001 to 103G. 145 (West Supp. 1995);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:91-1 to 13:9B-30 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 24-010 to 24-1305 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-32-01 to 61-32-11
(Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-1-18 to 2-1-24 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.91 to 403.939 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN., ch. 131, §§ 40 to 40-A (1989 & Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482-A:t to 482-
A:15 (1992 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 851-865 (1984).
78. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-A to 480-U (West 1989 & Supp. 1994);
WIS. STAT. ANN., §§ 61.351, 62.231 (West 1988).
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B. Federal Legislation
The permit program authorized by section 404 of the Clean Water
Act is the federal government's principal wetland protection tool.' 9
The Clean Water Act' is administered by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA).8 Section 301 of the Act prohibits the discharge of
pollutants' from any point source' into the waters of the United States
without a permit.' Section 402 authorizes the issuance of such per-
mits.' This permitting program is known as the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).' However, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps), rather than the EPA, is responsible for
enforcing the provisions of section 4 04 .' This section of the Clean
Water Act prohibits dredging88 and filling89 operations in waters of the
United States without a permit from the Corps. 9°
79. Other programs include the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3901-3932 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which authorizes the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to pur-
chase wetlands, and the "swampbuster" provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985, 16 U.S.C.
§ 3821 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which makes farmers who produce agricultural commodities on
wetlands converted into upland after 1985 ineligible for most USDA financial assistance.
80. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1988).
82. The term "pollutant" means "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, gar-
bage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal and agricultural
waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1988).
83. The Act defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (e) (1988).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988). The EPA may delegate its permitting authority to states that
have adopted similar, qualified programs. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (1988). This permitting authority was given to the Corps because
it was already administering a dredge and fill program under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151, now codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988). Eric W.
Nagle, Note, Wetlands Protection and the Neglected Child of the Clean Water Ad: A Proposal for
Shared Custody of Section 404, 5 VA. 1. NAT. RESOURCES L. 227, 230-31 (1985).
88. "Dredged material" means "material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the Unit-
ed States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1994).
89. "Fill material" means "any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic
area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of an [sic] waterbody. The term does not
include any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regu-
lated under section 402 of the Clean Water Act." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1994).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
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1. Jurisdictional Issues
The section 404 permit system is not intended to be a comprehensive
wetland protection scheme. First of all, the Corps' authority under the
Clean Water Act only extends to discharges into waters of the United
States. In addition, the definition of jurisdictional wetlands, though quite
broad, leaves some wetland areas unregulated. Finally, section 404 itself
expressly exempts certain types of activities from regulation.
a. Waters of the United States
During the early years of the section 404 permit program, the Corps
construed its regulatory authority narrowly, exercising jurisdiction only
over discharges occurring in waters that met the traditional definition of
navigability. 9 However, after this practice was successfully challenged in
court,' the Corps issued new regulations which broadened its regulatory
authority beyond traditional navigable waters."' This expanded jurisdiction
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc. , and the Corps now regulates discharges into
rivers, lakes, wetlands, and many other aquatic systems, even though they
may not be navigable in the conventional sense.95
91. Nagle, supra note 87, at 232. The Corps took this position because it believed that the
powers given to it under section 404 were coterminous with its authority under section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act. See Gerald Torres, Wetlands and Agriculture: Environmental Regulation and
the Limits of Private Property, 34 KAN. L. REV. 539, 546-49 (1986).
92. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
The court in Callaway declared,
Congress by defining the term "navigable waters" in section 502(7) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 to mean "waters of the United States, includ-
ing the territorial seas," asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maxi-
mum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as
used in the Water Act, the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability.
Id. at 686 (citations omitted).
93. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975) (interim final regulation); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977)
(final regulation, incorporating comments received on interim final regulation and responding to
problems which became apparent during first two years of administering the program under the inter-
im regulations (now codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320-340 (1994))).
94. 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) ("In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated
by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps'
ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate
basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.").
95. According to the Corps' regulations, "waters of the United States" include:
(I) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be suscepti-
ble to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
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Another jurisdictional issue that has arisen in the past was the
need for a nexus between wetland regulation and interstate com-
merce. 96 At one time, the Corps declined to assert jurisdiction over
isolated wetlands which had no obvious connection with interstate
commerce.' However, in 1986, the Corps announced that it would
regulate discharges into any waters which were, or could be, used as a
habitat by migratory birds and endangered species.98 This action was
subsequently upheld by the courts' and current regulations effectively
eliminate any interstate commerce limitation on the Corps' wetlands
jurisdiction."o Wetlands now fall within the definition of waters of the
United States if they are adjacent to waters that otherwise qualify as
waters of the United States.' 0
streams), muidflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate
or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreation-
al or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or
foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries in
interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United
States under this definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) (1) through (4) of
this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) (I) through (6) of this section.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1994).
96. See generally WANT, supra note 73, § 4.05; Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: The Case for Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 91 (1995).
97. See Jerry Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause: The Constitutionality of Current
Wetland Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 307, 319-
20 (1988) (discussing refusal of the Corps to assert jurisdiction over isolated wetlands of Madrona
Marsh in California and Hilton Head Island, South Carolina).
98. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986).
99. See, e.g., Hoffman Homes Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 999 F.2d
256 (7th Cir. 1993) ("We also agree . .. that it is reasonable to interpret the regulation as allowing migrato-
ry birds to be that connection between a wetland and interstate commerce."); Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The commerce clause power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is
broad enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds
and endangered species."); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher, 662 F. Supp. 548, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
("[A] wetland visited by migratory birds is a wetland within the jurisdiction of the federal defendants.").
100. See WANT, supra note 73, § 4.05[3] (language in current regulations covers practically
all wetlands and eliminates interstate commerce standard as a limitation on the Corps' jurisdic-
tion over wetlands).
101. The Corps' regulations state that "[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United
States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are 'adjacent
wetlands.'" 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (1994). The wetlands themselves do not have to have any demon-
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b. Identification of Jurisdictional Wetlands
The Corps defines jurisdictional wetlands as "those areas that are inun-
dated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil condi-
tions."l"2 The Corps has also published a manual that establishes procedures
for identifying jurisdictional wetlands and delimiting their boundaries.
0 3
According to this manual, three conditions, wetland hydrology, hydrophytic
vegetation, and hydric soils, must be present if an area is to be treated as a
wetland for regulatory purposes.'0" The wetland hydrology element is a water
requirement. The source of the water is not important. 5 Moreover, hydro-
logic factors do not have to exist continually; wetlands need only be subject
to periodic inundation." 6 The hydrophytic vegetation element requires that
the vegetation in the area include plants that are typically adapted for life in
saturated soils."°7 Marsh grasses, willows, tupelos, gum trees and cypress
strable effect on interstate commerce, nor do the wetlands have to have any physical connection or
effect on the stream or water body. Jackson, supra note 97, at 321.
102. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1994).
103. 1989 FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 12. The Corps first published a wetlands delineation
manual in 1987. The EPA subsequently issued its own manual. WANT, supra note 73, § 4.0911]. In
1989, four federal agencies published a new manual which incorporated a uniform wetland identifica-
tion procedure. Id. See also Theis, supra note 66, at 21-24; Babcock, supra note 61, at 340-50. Critics
of the 1989 Manual claimed that it improperly expanded the scope of the Corps' section 404 jurisdic-
tion. Theis, supra note 66, at 24. Under pressure from the White House, the four federal agencies
agreed to issue a proposed revised wetlands delineation manual which was more restrictive than the
1989 Manual. WANT, supra note 73, § 4.0911]. See 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (1991) (requesting public
comment on proposed revisions to manual). This, in turn, generated opposition from environmental-
ists. See Flint B. Ogle, Comment, The Ongoing Struggle Between Private Property Rights and Wetland
Regulation: Recent Developments and Proposed Solutions, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 573, 592-96 (1993)
(discussing the proposed revisions). President Bush signed a provision which prohibited the Corps
from using the 1989 Manual in permit application proceedings. Energy and Water Development Ap-
propriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-104, 105 Stat. 510, 518 (1991). The Corps now uses the
1987 Manual, although EPA continues to rely on the 1989 Manual. WANT, supra note 73, § 4.09[1].
104. 1989 FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 12, § 2.0. An area is subject to regulation even if these condi-
tions do not exist naturally, but are the product of human activity. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 651 F.
Supp. 320, 322 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (wetlands that are dependent upon manmade irrigation and flood control
structures for their water supply are subject to regulation by the Corps under section 404); Track 12, Inc. v.
District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 618 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Minn. 1985) ("[F]ederal juris-
diction is determined by whether the site is presently wetlands and not by how it came to be wetlands")
(quoting United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 494 (D.N.J. 1984)).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985)
(wetlands sustained by ground water are still subject to regulation under section 404). See also Bailey
v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (D. Idaho 1986).
106. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278, 289 (W.D. La.
1981) ("We find absolutely no basis for the contention that the words 'for life' means that 'wetlands'
vegetation must spend all of its life in inundated or saturated soils.") aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub
noa. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. 1989 FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3. 1. Wetland plants do not have to live their entire
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trees are examples of hydrophytic vegetation.' Finally, wetlands must con-
tain hydric soils. Hydric soils are "soils that are saturated, flooded, or
ponded long enough during the growing season to develop anaerobic condi-
tions in the upper part." t 9
c. Exempted Activities
Congress has exempted certain activities from compliance with section
404's permit requirements. Most of these activities are exempted because
they are not likely to have any significant impact on wetland areas. ° Some,
however, substantially reduce the scope of the Corps' permit program. One
of these is the exemption for "normal fanning, silviculture, and ranching
activities.""' This exemption is intended to apply to established everyday
farming activities such as plowing, harvesting and minor drainage activities
that have minimal effect on wetlands." 2 Certain federal construction projects
are also exempted from regulation under section 404. This exemption is
limited to projects specifically authorized by Congress and entirely planned,
financed, and constructed by a federal agency.' Furthermore, the Corps has
exempted by regulation de minimis, incidental soil movement occurring
during normal dredging operations." 4 Activities exempted from regulation
may be covered by the exemption's "recapture" provision."' Under this
provision, exempted activities may be brought back under regulation if they
involve a major change in use." 6 This provision has been invoked to prevent
life cycle in saturated soil as long as a significant portion of the growing season is spent in such soil.
In addition, the presence of plant types other than hydrophytic vegetation does not preclude an area
from being classified as a wetland. O'Hagan, supra note 45, at 1072.
108. O'Hagan, supra note 45, at 1072.
109. 1989 FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 12, § 2.6.
110. Exempted activities include such things as maintenance and emergency repair of currently
serviceable structures, and general maintenance (but not construction) of drainage ditches. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(f)(1) (1988).
111. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (1988).
112. Cf. United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 192 (6th Cir. 1988) (farming exemption does
not apply to clearing timber in wetlands in order to convert the area into upland suitable for culti-
vation of new crops), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016 (1989); United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819
(9th Cir. 1986) (conversion of swampland into farmland suitable for growing crops not within farm-
ing exemption), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986); United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1241-
43 (9th Cir. !985) (farming exemption does not exempt ditching and other activities associated with
large cranberry farming operation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1983) (clearing land in order to convert
wetland from silviculture to agricultural use is not within farming exemption).
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(r) (1988). See Blumm, supra note 37, 424-28 (discussing the federal
construction exemption).
114. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(ii) (1994).
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(2) (1988).
116. Section 404(0(2) declares that any discharge incidental to a change in use of the waters of the
United States which impairs the flow or reach of waters of the United States requires a permit. 33 U.S.C.
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farmers from converting wetlands to agricultural use without obtaining a
dredge and fill permit." 7
2. The Permit Application Process
The Corps receives approximately 15,000 applications for individual
permits each year."18 In theory, the permitting process for individual
permits is a rigorous one." 9 Upon receiving an application,"z the Corps
district office provides notice of the proposed discharge to the public,
EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service and various state and local environmental
protection agencies."' 1 The District Engineer may also prepare an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement if one is required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act." In some cases, a public hearing may be held."
However, the heart of the review process is the evaluation of the applica-
tion for compliance with the EPA's section 404(b)(1) Guidelines2 and
the review to ensure compliance with the Corps' public interest criteria. '2
Once this review process is complete, the District Engineer will deny the
permit application, issue the permit in accordance with the applicant's
original plan, or issue the permit subject to special conditions.'2
§ 1344(f)(2) (1988). See Tripp & Herz, supra note 66, at 236-38 (discussing § 404(f)'s recapture provision).
117. See, e.g., Conant v. United States, 786 F.2d 1008, 1010 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986); United States v.
Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 647 F.
Supp. 1166, 1176-77 (D. Mass. 1986). aft'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1016 (1988).
118. Sugameli, supra note 6, at 486 (1993) (15,064 permit applications were made in 1992).
119. For a description of the permit application process see Dickerson, supra note 36, at 1485-
88; Andrew H. Ernst & Wade W. Herring, 11, Water, Water Everywhere, Better Call the Corps:
Section 404 Regulation of Wetlands, 41 MERCER L. REV. 843, 851-59 (1990).
120. Property owners may consult with staff members in Corps district offices prior to submit-
ting a permit application to determine if a permit is required for their proposed activity. 33 C.F.R.
§ 325.1(b) (1994).
121. 33 C.F.R. § 325.3 (1994).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4221-4347 (1988). See generally Ellen K. Lawson, Note, The Corps of
Engineers' Public Interest Review Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Broad Discretion
Leaves Wetlands Vulnerable to Unnecessary Destruction, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 203,
212-15 (1988) (discussing the applicability of NEPA to the section 404 permit application process).
123. 33 C.F.R. § 327.4 (1994). If a public hearing is held, the district engineer or a deputy acts
as the presiding officer. Id. § 327.5(a)(1).
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1988). See discussion infra part I.B.2.b.
125. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1994). See discussion infra part II.B.2.a.
126. Each year, the Corps denies about 3 percent of the permit applications it receives. The
Corps also significantly modifies approximately 33 percent of these permit applications and approves
50 percent without modification. The remaining 14 percent are withdrawn by the applicants. Hanley,
supra note 10, at 324, n.51. However, many of those who withdraw their application for an individ-
ual permit are able to qualify for a general permit. Swords, supra note 14, at 177-78 (the Corps
issues approximately 10,000 individual permits each year, denies about 500 permit applications, and
another 4,500 applicants either qualify for a general permit or withdraw their applications).
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a. The Public Interest Review
One of the most important elements of the section 404 permit pro-
gram is the public interest review process. The Corps' regulations identify
a variety of factors that must be considered in the public interest review
process. 27 These include economics, aesthetics, effects on wetlands,
historic preservation, fish and wildlife values, effects on flood plains, land
use, navigation, recreation, energy needs and "in general, the needs and
welfare of the people."" z Taking these factors into account, the Corps
balances the benefits to be derived from the proposed project against its
foreseeable costs.2 The Corps may grant a permit if the results of this
balancing process are positive, but it must deny the application if the costs
of the proposed discharge are found to outweigh its gains."0
b. Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines
The Corps also evaluates the proposal for consistency with section
404(b)(1) Guidelines."'3 According to these Guidelines, proposals may be
permitted only if: (1) no practicable alternatives are available;. (2) there
will be no significant degradation to waters of the United States; (3) all
reasonable mitigation measures will be employed; ' 4 and (4) no statutory
violations will occur.
35
First, the Guidelines require the applicant to show that there are
no practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge. 36 Where the
discharge will occur in wetlands or other special aquatic sites,"V7 the
Guidelines assume that practicable alternatives exist when the proposed
discharge is for non-water dependent activity. 38 To rebut this pre-
127. See generally Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 65, at 731-36; Robert E. Steinberg & Michael
G. Dowd, Economic Considerations in the Section 404 Wetland Permit Process, 7 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURcEs 277, 282-87 (1988); Lawson, supra note 122, at 218-26.
128. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (1994).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-230.80 (1994). See generally Blumm &
Zaleha, supra note 65, at 736-40; Ernst & Herring, supra note 119, at 856-58; Ferretti, supra note 36.
132. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1994).
133. Id. § 230.10(c).
134. Id. § 230.10(d).
135. Id. § 230.10(b).
136. See Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 773, 798-813 (discussing the
no practicable alternative" requirement).
137. In addition to wetlands, special aquatic sites include wildlife sanctuaries and refuges, mud flats,
vegetated shallows, coral reefs, and riffle and pool complexes. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.40-230.45 (1994).
138. Id. § 230. 10(a)(3) (1994). See Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 603 F. Supp. 518. 527
(W.D. La. 1984) ("The determination that a project is non-water-dependent simply necessitates a
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sumption, the applicant must "clearly demonstrate" that practicable
alternatives do not in fact exist.'39
The Guidelines also prohibit the issuance of a permit if the discharge
"will cause or contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the Unit-
ed States."140 The Guidelines further provide that "[flindings of significant
degradation shall be based upon appropriate factual determinations, evalua-
tions, and tests." 141 Among the factors that must be considered are the effects
of the discharge of the pollutants on (1) human health or welfare, (2) aquatic
and other wildlife, (3) aquatic ecosystem diversity, productivity and stability,
and (4) recreational, aesthetic and economic values.' 42
In addition, the Guidelines provide that no permit shall be issued
"unless appropriate and practicable steps have been taken which will
minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic ecosys-
tem." 143 In some cases the mitigation requirement may be satisfied by
reducing the area the applicant proposes to dredge or fill.'4 In other cas-
es, the applicant may be required to restore degraded wetlands by seed-
ing, regrading or irrigation measures. 45 Where these alternatives are not
feasible, the Corps may order the applicant to compensate for the destruc-
tion of existing wetlands by creating new wetlands elsewhere."4
Finally, the Guidelines declare that the permit must not violate applica-
ble federal and state regulations. 47 This requirement is designed to ensure
that discharges permitted under section 404 do not interfere with the opera-
tion of federal or state statutes that protect wildlife sanctuaries, endangered
species, or the coastal zones or regulate the discharge of toxic substances.' 1
more persuasive showing than otherwise concerning the lack of alternatives."), aff'd in part & va-
cated in part, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985).
139. See Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 84 (D. Mass. 1982) (invalidating permit because
applicants failed to clearly demonstrate that no feasible alternatives to project were available); Shore-
line Assoc. v. Marsh, 555 F. Supp. 169, 180 (D. Md. 1983) (upholding permit denial under section
404(b)(1) Guidelines because alternative was available for non-water-dependent project), aff'd, 725
F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1984).
140. 40 C.F.R. § 230. 10(c) (1994).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (1994). Mitigation is also an important aspect of the Corps' public
interest review process. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (1994).
144. Lawson, supra note 122, at 217.
145. Ferretti, supra note 36, at 120.
146. See Virginia C. Veltman, Comment, Banking on the Future of Wetlands Using Federal Law, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 654, 657-58 (1995) (describing offsite mitigation procedures). See, e.g., Friends of the
Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 826 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (required conversion of 17 acres of pasture back into
wetlands); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 1983) (required creation of six
green tree reservoirs and implementation of intense wildlife management program).
147. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b) (1994).
148. Ferretti, supra note 36, at 121.
1995
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
c. EPA Veto Authority
Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA to veto
the granting of a permit if it determines, after notice and an opportunity
for a hearing, that the proposed discharge will have "an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery
areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational
areas."' 49 Although seldom used, this veto power gives the EPA consider-
able power over the section 404 permit process."
3. General Permits
Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue "general permits" on a
state, regional, or nationwide basis, thereby exempting certain classes of
users from individual permit requirements.' The purpose of the nation-
wide permits is to reduce unnecessary federal regulation and red tape.152
In 1992, about 42,000 persons qualified for general permits. 53
The Corps has issued thirty-seven nationwide permits to date, cover-
ing such activities as fish harvesting, bank stabilization, minor road cross-
ing fills and bridge building." Of particular importance to wetlands is
Permit Number 26, which authorizes discharges of fill material into
wetlands smaller than ten acres located above the headwaters of nontidal
waters or into "isolated waters" that are not part of a surface tributary
stream.' This effectively exempts many activities on agricultural
wetlands from section 404's individual permitting requirements. 1
56
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988). See Bersani v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 674
F. Supp. 405, 411, 420-21 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding EPA veto based on finding that there were
practicable nonwetland sites available for proposed project), affid, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied. 489 U.S. 1089 (1989). See also Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 65, at 742-44 (1989) (discuss-
ing the Bersani case).
150. Ernst & Herring, supra note 119, at 860.
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1988).
152. A nationwide permit is automatically granted for those who qualify and no application is
needed before beginning the discharge activity. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp.
583, 585 (D. Colo. 1983), aft'd, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985). However, district engineers have the
authority to modify, condition or revoke general permits when necessary to ensure that wetlands are
protected. 33 C.F.R. §§ 325.4, 325.7 (1994).
153. Sugameli, supra note 6, at 486 (in 1992, the Corps issued 26,054 nationwide general
permits and 15,930 regional general permits).
154. 33 C.F.R. § 330 app. A (1994).
155. M.
156. Theis, supra note 66, at 20. These permits exempt about 17 million acres of wetlands from
compliance with individual permitting requirements and authorize 40,000 discharges annually. Nagle,
supra note 87, at 237. See also Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 65, at 726.
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III. PRE-LUCAS TAKINGS CASES
A. The Law of Regulatory Takings
The Takings, or Just Compensation, Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution declares that private property may not be taken
for public use without payment of just compensation.'57 The original purpose
of this provision was to require the government to pay compensation when it
physically appropriated private property for public use.' However, with the
increase in governmental regulation in the twentieth century, the courts began
to recognize that a compensable taking could occur in the absence of a physi-
cal occupation. This type of taking, known as a regulatory taking, takes place
when the government places such severe restrictions on the use of property
that it leaves the owner with little more than bare legal title.'59
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"W was the first case to hold that the
government must compensate landowners when regulations unreasonably
restrict the use of their property.' 6' In Mahon, a coal company challenged the
validity of a state statute that prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in
residential areas in order to protect overlying structures against subsidence
damage. The Court in Mahon concluded that a taking had occurred even
though the government had not physically destroyed or cuppied the coal
company's property.' 62 According to the Court, regulatory restrictions on the
use of land were ordinarily valid even though they decreased the value of
affected property. 1 3 However, the government would be required to compen-
sate property owners when its regulations went "too far."' 64
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause is binding on the states through the application
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Coun-
ty, 482 U.S. 304, 310 n. 4 (1987); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
158. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081-83 (1993) (the Takings Clause was
intended to apply to eminent domain); William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Signifi-
cance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) (the
purpose of the Takings Clause was to assure compensation for physical takings). During the nine-
teenth century and later, the Supreme Court relied on the Takings Clause to mandate compensation
for landowners whose property had been physically invaded as the result of governmental action. See
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 469 (1903) (overflow from navigation project turned plaintiff's
rice plantation into a bog); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 167, 181 (1871)
(state authorized dam on river caused upstream lake to overflow its banks and flood plaintiff's land).
159. See James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 70
DEN. U.L. REV. 497, 498 (1993); Lynda G. Cook, Comment, Lucas and Endangered Species Protec-
tion: When "Take" and "Takings" Collide, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 201 (1993).
160. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
161. Patrick Kennedy, Comment, The United States Claims Court: A Safe "Harbor" from Gov-
ernment Regulation of Privately Owned Wetlands. 9 PACE ENVrL. L. REV. 723, 726 (1992).
162. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
163. Id. at 413. "[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power." Id.
164. Id. at 415. "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes
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The approach that the Mahon Court used to determine when com-
pensation must be paid has come to be known as the diminution-in-value
test. 65 To apply this test, the court must first determine the value of the
affected property before and after the regulation is applied.' 66 It then
calculates the percentage of the decline in value and decides if the result-
ing loss is sufficient to justify compensation.
67
During the period between Mahon and Lucas, the Court employed
two different approaches to determine whether a regulatory taking had oc-
curred. 6 ' The first approach, which originated in Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. New York City,'69 determines whether a taking has occurred
by balancing the interests of the public against those of the property own-
er. 70 Under the second test, derived from Agins v. City of Tiburon,171 the
Court may find that a taking exists if the regulation does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest or if it deprives the landowner of all
economically viable use of his or her property.'72
1. The Penn Central Balancing Approach
In Penn Central, the Court identified three factors to be considered
in a regulatory takings case: (1) the character of the governmental action
involved; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the economic impact of the regu-
lation upon the property owner. 173
The first factor is concerned with whether the governmental action
in question is a physical invasion or whether it is an accepted form of
too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
165. See Donald W. Large. This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Prop-
erty, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039, 1056.
166. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1229-34 (1967).
167. See Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Taking Clause: The Search for a Better
Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 19-20 (1987).
168. See Laurie G. Ballinger, Note, A House Built on Sand: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 71 N.C. L. REV. 928, 934 (1993).
169. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
170. See Scarlott, supra note 65, at 919. Penn Central arose out the refusal of the New York
Landmarks Preservation Commission to allow the Penn Central Co. to construct a multistory office
building over Grand Central Station Terminal. Penn Central claimed that the Commission's action de-
prived it of the use of the airspace above the Terminal. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-17. The
Court, however, upheld the validity of the Landmarks Preservation Law. Id. at 138.
171. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
172. Id. at 260.
173. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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economic regulation. 74 For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corporation,7 5 the Court struck down a New York statute
because it required landlords to permit cable television companies to
install cable facilities on their property.' 76 The Court characterized this as
a physical invasion of the plaintiff's property.'" Similarly, in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 78 the Court held that the Corps of Engineers,
which had allowed a landowner to construct a marina on a nonnavigable
pond and to connect the pond to the ocean, could not subsequently com-
pel him to admit members of the general public to the pond and the mari-
na. 79 Once again, the Court reasoned that the Corps' action was tanta-
mount to a physical invasion, and thus a per se taking. 0
The second factor focuses on "investment-backed expectations.''. The
purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether a property owner who com-
mits significant resources to a project has good reason to think that the gov-
ernment will not subsequently impose regulations that prevent the project
from being completed or add substantially to its original cost."" The underly-
ing assumption is that a landowner's reasonable expectations should not be
frustrated by subsequent governmental action unless the need to regulate is
very compelling. However, to claim interference with an investment-backed
expectation, property owners must be able to point to specific facts and
circumstances that make their expectations reasonable." 3 Thus, in Penn Cen-
tral, the Court rejected the landowner's investment-backed expectations claim
because these expectations were based on the Terminal's present use as a rail-
road station rather than on possible future uses of the airspace above the
Terminal. Since the Landmarks Preservation Law only restricted a use of the
airspace, the Court concluded that it did not frustrate Penn Central's expecta-
tions with respect to use of the Terminal."' 4
174. See Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory
Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use, "Average Reciprocity of Advantage, 'and "Bundle
of Rights 'from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal. 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 713 (1987).
175. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
176. Id. at 426.
177. Id. at 438.
178. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
179. Id. at 179-80.
180. id. at 180.
181. Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Prof. Frank
Michelman apparently coined this phrase. See Michelman, supra note 166, at 1233 (A taking occurs when a
claimant is deprived of "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation[s].").
182. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking? 31 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 42 (1987).
183. See Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modem Plot for an Old Constitutional
Tale, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 41 (1989).
184. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. On the other hand, the landowner in Kaiser Aetna was
able to persuade the Court that the actions of the Corps of Engineers in allowing it to improve the
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The final factor to be considered is the economic impact of the regu-
lation upon the property. When a regulation severely burdens a property
owner, a court may conclude that a taking has occurred even though the
other factors weigh in the government's favor.'5 However, the courts
employ several techniques to undercut allegations of adverse economic
impact by property owners. One technique, commonly referred to as the
principle of "average reciprocity of advantage,"'" allows a court to offset
losses by taking into account any benefits to the property owner that arise
from the regulation."7 For example, in Penn Central, although the Court
acknowledged that the property owner was burdened by the regulation, it
concluded that benefits that accrued from the regulation largely offset this
burden. '
In addition, when a court evaluates a regulation's economic impact, it
often looks at the entire property interest involved, rather than at some lesser
interest.'89 In Penn Central, the landowner claimed that the Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law deprived it of all gainful use of the airspace above the Termi-
nal.t" However, the Court declared that it must consider the economic im-
pact of the regulation on Penn Central's entire "bundle of rights" in the
Terminal rather than focusing solely on the regulation's effect on airspace.'9 '
pond gave rise to an expectation that the landowner could continue to exclude the public from the
pond and the marina. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
185. See Raymond R. Colette, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a
New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 297, 349 (1990). "The Court has consis-
tently maintained that economic harm, especially when disproportionately concentrated on a few indi-
viduals, may form the basis of a regulatory takings claim." Id.
186. "Average reciprocity of advantage" originally meant that compensation need not be paid
when a party giving up property received in exchange a new benefit, not shared by the general pub-
lic. See Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensa-
tion Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 139, 173 (1990).
187. Collette, supra note 185, at 351 ("[R]eciprocal advantages contribute to an economic mix
wherein the level of a regulation's impact may be effectively diluted.").
188. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35. But see Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline
of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481, 485 (1983) (contending that there was no plausible reci-
procity of advantage to the landowner in Penn Central); Alfred P. Levitt, Comment, Taking on a
New Direction: The Rehnquist-Scalia Approach to Regulatory Takings, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 197, 208-09
(1993) (criticizing the Court's reliance on reciprocity of advantage in Penn Central).
189. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). "MWjhere an owner possesses a
full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id.
190. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
191. 438 U.S. at 130-31. The Court employed a similar approach in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In that case, coal owners challenged the validity
of regulations adopted pursuant to a state subsidence control statute. The regulations required land-
owners to keep 50% of the coal in place beneath buildings in order to provide surface support. Id. at
476-77. The plaintiffs in Keystone claimed that coal in place was a separate property interest for
taking issue purposes, Id. at 496-97. However, the Court concluded that this coal did not constitute a
separate property interest distinct from the plaintiffs' coal reserves as a whole. Id. at 498.
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The Court reaffirmed the Penn Central requirements in Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., " a case which involved the constitu-
tionality of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980."93
In Connolly, the Court declared that it would consider the following
factors in takings cases: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the
claimant's distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character
of the governmental action. 94
2. The Agins Formula
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 95 the plaintiffs challenged the validity of
two local ordinances that limited the number of residential dwellings that
could be constructed on their five-acre tract of land. The plaintiffs maintained
that the city's density restrictions made it economically impossible for them
to develop their property.'96 On appeal, the Court first declared that the ques-
tion of identifying a regulatory taking involved a "weighing of public and
private interests. ""9 However, the Court then proposed a two-factor test that
appeared to involve no balancing at all. 198 According to the Agins Court, a
taking would occur if: (1) the regulation failed to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest; or (2) if it deprived the landowner of all economical-
ly viable use of his or her property.' In other words, each prong of the
Agins analysis was apparently sufficient to sustain a taking claim and the
plaintiff did not have to prove both parts of the test.m°
The requirement that a regulation "substantially advance legitimate
governmental goals" is traditionally associated with substantive due pro-
192. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1988).
194. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
195. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
196. The California Supreme Court upheld the validity of the ordinance. See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
197. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
198. See Ann T. Kadlecek, Note, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the
Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REv. 415, 419-20 (1993) (the Agins two-pan test does not
involve a balancing of interests); R. Blair Norman, Comment, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil: The "No Economically Viable Use Test, " Not a Panacea for Individual Property Owners, but a
Step in the Right Direction, 18 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 153, 162 (1993) (the Agins formula is categori-
cal). However, some courts appear to have balanced public and private interests to determine whether
the landowner has established that the first prong of the Agins test has been met. See, e.g., Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388-90 (1988) (weighing the government's interest in
preventing pollution against the economic interests of the landowner).
199. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
200. See Jan G. Laitos, The Taking Clause in America's Industrial States After Lucas, 24
TOLEDO L. REV. 281, 297 (1993).
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cess.2 1 In Agins, however, the Court incorporated this principle into its
takings analysis.' In that case, the Court concluded that the Tiburon ordi-
nance substantially advanced legitimate governmental goals by protecting the
public against the adverse effects of uncontrolled urbanization.2
The Agins Court also held that an otherwise valid regulation would
constitute a taking if it deprived the claimant of all economically viable
use of his property.' The Court in Agins did not explain what it meant
by the expression "all economically viable use" because it concluded that
the plaintiffs had not shown that they had suffered any loss as a result of
the ordinances.2' 5 However, the Lucas Court later relied this principle to
construct its categorical "total takings" rule.'
B. State Takings Cases
In the 1960's and early 1970's, a number of environmental zoning
ordinances and statutes were struck down by state courts.7 For example,
in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills' the New Jersey Supreme court held that a zoning ordinance,
designed to preserve a nearby wetlands area, was "constitutionally unrea-
sonable and confiscatory" because it prevented a gravel pit operator from
making any beneficial use of his land. 2' The Connecticut Supreme Court
made a similar finding in Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission.'
The ordinance in question established a flood plain zone along a tidal
stream and prohibited filling within that area. The court concluded that
the uses permitted by the ordinance were impracticable, resulting in a 75
percent decrease in the market value of the plaintiff's property. 211 Finally,
201. See John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regula-
tion and Public Use, 34 RuTGERs L. REV. 243, 270 (1982). "The first type of limit referred to [in
Agins] . . . corresponds essentially to the limits, albeit extensive, of the police power itself, and is
rooted in the due process clauses of the Constitution." Id.
202. See Norman Williams, Jr. et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 V'T. L. REV. 193, 213-
14 (1984) (criticizing the Court for injecting substantive due process concepts into takings analysis).
203. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
204. Id. at 260. The expression "no economically viable use" originated in a footnote in the Penn
Central case. See Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
205. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
206. See Norman, supra note 198, at 173.
207. For a discussion of these early cases, see Robert C. Ausness, A Survey of State Regulation
of Dredge and Fill Operations in Nonnavigable Waters, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 65, 73-84 (1973).
208. 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
209. Id. at 242.
210. 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964).
211. Id. at 774. See also Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of Old Lynme, 282 A.2d 907, 910
(Conn. 1971) (holding a local ordinance which restricted uses on tidal marshland to wooden walkways,
wharves, duck blinds, public boat landings and public ditches was unreasonable and confiscatory).
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the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed the denial of a dredge and
fill permit in State v. Johnson."' The court determined that the plaintiff's
property, which lay within a salt marsh, would have no commercial value
if filling were not permitted." 3
However, in recent years, state courts have become increasingly
hostile to takings claims brought by disappointed landowners.214 The
reason for this change is that many state courts now recognize the value
of wetlands and the need to protect them against harm.2" Candlestick
Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development
Commission,1 6 decided in 1970, was one of the first cases to consider
wetland values as part of its takings analysis. In Candlestick, the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)
refused to allow the plaintiff to deposit fill on his partially submerged
property in San Francisco Bay.2"7 The trial court upheld the Board's deci-
212. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
213. Id. at 716.
214. See, e.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses
Agency of Town of Greenwich, 593 A.2d 1368, 1374 (Conn. 1991); Manor Dev. Corp. v. Conser-
vation Comm'n of Town of Simsbury, 433 A.2d 999, 1002 (Conn. 1980); Brecciaroli v. Comm'r of
Envd. Protection, 362 A.2d 948, 952-53 (Conn. 1975); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.
2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Gov-
ernor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241, 248 (Md. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Moskow v.
Comm'r of Dept. of Envtl. Management, 427 N.E.2d 750, 753-4 (Mass. 1981); Lovequist v. Conser-
vation Comm'n of Town of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 859, 866 (Mass. 1979); Claridge v. New Hampshire
Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984); State Wetlands Bd. v. Marshall, 500 A.2d 685, 690
(N.H. 1975); Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1975); American Dredging Co. v. State
Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 391 A.2d 1265, 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978); De St. Aubin v.
Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879, 886 (N.Y. 1986); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d
327, 329 (S.C. 1984); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 (Wis. 1972); but see Vatalaro
v. Dept. of Envtl. Regulation, 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a takings
claim by a landowner who was limited by state agency to construction of an elevated wooden board-
walk over a portion of her wetlands property).
215. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 948, 951 (Conn. 1975)
("[it is declared to be the public policy of this state to preserve the wetlands and to prevent the de-
spoliation and destruction thereof."); Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1379 ("Because of the sensitive nature
of the land, it was not unreasonable for the commission to place a great deal of weight on the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed development."); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of
Maryland, 293 A.2d 241, 249 (Md. 1972) ("[S]ites in question support such species of fish as her-
ring, American shad, hickory shad, striped bass, white perch and el perch."); Claridge v. New
Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984) ("the public policy of the State has recog-
nized the importance of these wetlands, and strong regulations to protect wetlands have been enact-
ed"); American Dredging Co. v. State Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 391 A.2d 1265, 1269 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) ("Water, land and air cannot be misused or abused without dire present and
future consequences to all mankind."); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972)
("[Swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are essen-
tial to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams.").
216. 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
217. Id. at 899.
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sion.218 On appeal, the court in Candlestick reviewed various legislative
findings on the value of San Francisco Bay's tideland areas and the need
to prevent further harm from unrestricted filling. 19 In response to the
plaintiff's takings claim, the court declared that "[ifn view the necessity
for controlling the filling of the bay, as expressed by the Legislature in
the provisions discussed above, it is clear that the restriction imposed
does not go beyond proper regulation such that the restriction would be
referable to the power of eminent domain rather than the police pow-
er. "n Accordingly, the court affirmed BCDC's denial of the permit."'
Another reason why takings claims often fail is that state courts
refuse to find that a takings exists unless the landowner can establish that
the regulatory agency will not allow any amended applications to be
submitted.' Courts that dismiss takings claims on "ripeness" grounds
assume that a landowner who keeps submitting new applications will
eventually be allowed to make some productive use of the land, thereby
obviating the need for compensation. 3 Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Water-
courses Agency of the Town of Greenwich,' decided by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in 1991, illustrates how this ripeness requirement may be
invoked to defeat a takings claim. The plaintiff in Gil purchased a four-
acre tract in a residential zone of Greenwich, Connecticut.' More than
90 percent of the plaintiffs property consisted of wetlands and was,
therefore, subject to regulation by the town's inland and watercourses
agency.m In 1982, Gil applied for a permit to construct a single-family
residence, but the agency refused to issue a permit.27 The landowner filed
218. Id.
219. Id. at 900-01.
220. Id. at 906.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Comm'r of Envil. Protection, 362 A.2d 948, 952 (Conn. 1975) ("The
plaintiff may still be permitted on subsequent application to fill a lesser portion of his wetland to be used in
conjunction with the 3.1 acres of the parcel not classified as wetland."); Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 346 A.2d 612, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("Plaintiff has not availed itself of the proce-
dures set forth in the statute to deternine the extent to which the purposes for which its lands may be used.
Under the circumstances we have no hesitancy in concluding that no taking has occuned.").
223. The United Supreme Court has been receptive to this approach in zoning cases. See
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (finding that a takings claim
cannot be adjudicated until county makes a final and authoritative determination of type and intensity
of development that it would permit on plaintiffs property); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985) (holding that a takings claim could not be
properly evaluated until agency made a final, definitive decision about how the regulation would be
applied to the plaintiff's property).
224. 593 A.2d 1368 (Conn. 1991).
225. Id. at 1370.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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a second application in 1984, but it too was denied by the agency because
it was found to be incomplete. Gil's third permit application, filed in
1985, was also denied even though he offered to mitigate some the harm-
ful effects of the proposed construction.2' Gil brought suit after the agen-
cy turned down his fourth application in 1988. 9 Both the trial court and
an intermediate appellate court concluded that the permit denial amounted
to a regulatory taking.' However, the Connecticut Supreme Court, while
conceding that the plaintiff was entitled to develop his land in some fash-
ion," z declared that a regulatory takings claim would not be entitled to
judicial review on the merits until the landowner established the finality of
the agency's determination. 2 Even though the agency had rejected four
permit applications, the court suggested that the agency might grant a
permit for a smaller house than Gil's earlier applications had proposed. 32
Finally, some courts deny takings claims because they believe that the
government should not have to pay compensation when a regulation merely
restricts wetland property to its "natural" condition.' This theory, a variant
of the harm/benefit test, was first suggested by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Just v. Marinette County.215 Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,"6 decid-
228. Id. at 1370-71.
229. Id. at 1371.
230. See Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 580 A.2d 539 (Conn. Ct. App. 1990).
231. 593 A.2d at 1373-74.
232. Id. at 1374.
233. Id. at 1374-75.
234. See, e.g., Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1975) ("The board has not denied
plaintiffs' current uses of their marsh but prevented a major change in the marsh that plaintiffs seek to
make for speculative profit."); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327. 329 (S.C.
1984) (quoting Just v. Marinette Co., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972)) ("While unquestionably
respondent's wetland would have greater value to him if it were filled, '[a]n owner of land has no
absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others.'").
235. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). The plaintiffs in Just owned a parcel of land along the south
shore of a navigable freshwater lake in Wisconsin. Much of the land was designated as wetlands in
accordance with the provisions of Marinette County's shoreland zoning ordinance. Id. at 766. The
ordinance required landowners to obtain a permit to fill within such areas. Id. When the Justs began
to fill a portion of their property near the shore of the lake, the county brought suit to enjoin them
from further filling until they had applied for the requisite permit. Id. at 767. On appeal, the Justs
argued that the ordinance constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. Id. at 767.
The court, however, upheld the validity of the ordinance and associated state shorelands protection
statute. Id. at 772. The court distinguished between regulations that were intended to obtain a benefit
and those that were intended to prevent a future harm. According to the court, the state would be
required to compensate injured parties in the former situation, but not in the latter. Id. at 767. In the
court's view, the purpose of the ordinance was to preserve the existing value of the wetlands and to
prevent pollution of lakes and streams-an objective that did not require compensation to affected
property owners. Id. at 768-69. The court in Just also proposed the following corollary to the harm-
benefit rule: "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others." Id. at 768. This suggests that landowners may not be entitled to
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ed by the Florida Supreme Court in 1981, provides a more recent illustration
of this principle. In 1975, Estuary applied to the Board of County Commis-
sioners for approval to construct a development on a 6500-acre site located
along Estero and San Carlos Bays near Fort Meyers, Florida. 7 Estuary's
plan called for the construction of 26,500 dwellings and commercial facilities
for an eventual population of 73,000.11 The proposed development was large
enough to qualify as a Development of Regional Impact and was, therefore,
subject to the permitting requirements of the Florida Environmental Land and
Water Management Act." Estuary planned to construct most of its develop-
ment in a tidal wetland area populated by red and black mangroves.' Al-
though Estuary did not plan to carry out any construction in the red man-
grove forest, it did intend to dredge a 7.5 mile interceptor waterway through
the black mangroves.24
Estuary submitted its development plan to the Board of County Com-
missioners and the Southwest Florida Regional Planning council (SWFRPC).
After extensive review, SWFRPC recommended that it be rejected. 2 After a
series of public hearings, the Board of County Commissioners adopted
SWRPC's findings and recommendations and concluded that the proposed
development would degrade the waters of Estero and San Carlos Bays.'
Accordingly, the Board denied both the zone change and the application for
development approval.' The Board listed twelve conditions that would have
to be met before it would agree to approve Estuary's development plan.'4
Estuary unsuccessfully appealed the Board's decision to the Florida Land and
Water Adjudicatory Commission (LWAC).2 Estuary then sought further
review from the district court of appeal, which held that the Board's action
constituted a regulatory taking. 47
compensation when the government restricts developmental activities in order to preserve wetlands in
their natural state.
236. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub nort. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
237. Id. at 1376.
238. Id.
239. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (1988 & 1994 Supp.).
240. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1376. There were about 2800 acres of red mangroves
located at the seaward edge of the proposed development. These were subject to the daily ebb and
flow of the tide. An 1800-acre forest of predominantly black mangroves was located immediately
inward from the red mangroves. The black mangroves were also subject to tidal action during most of
the year. The remaining 1800 acres of Estuary's property ranged from two to five feet above sea
level. Only 526 acres of Estuary's property was sufficiently dry to be classified as upland. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1377.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1138-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court invoked the harm/benefit test
to reject Estuary's takings claim. 48 The court in Graham agreed with the
Board and LWAC that destruction of the mangroves and creation of the
interceptor waterway would pollute the surrounding waters.29 Therefore,
according to the court, the Board's action was intended to prevent a fu-
ture harm from occurring." This, in the court's view was quite different
from regulatory action that was intended to create a public benefit that did
not exist before."5 To bolster this conclusion, the court quoted with ap-
proval language from the Just decision which declared that property
owners did not have an absolute right to alter the natural condition of
their land."5 Consequently, the court in Graham remanded the decision to
the district court of appeal with instructions.2'
C. Federal Takings Cases
A landowner whose permit application is denied may bring a claim
for compensation against the federal government under the Tucker Act.'
The Tucker Act vests the United States Claims Court with exclusive
jurisdiction to hear all claims founded upon the Constitution for which
plaintiffs seek judgment against the federal government in excess of
$10,000.5" In recent years, a number of landowners have brought takings
claims in federal courts with varying degrees of success.
248. Estuary Properties, 399 So.2d at 1381-82, The court also disagreed with Estuary's claim
that it could make no productive use of its land if it were not allowed to construct an interceptor
waterway through the black mangrove forest. Id. at 1382.
249. Id. at 1382.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. id.
253. Id. at 1383.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(i) (1988). As an alternative to an action against the federal govern-
ment for compensation under the Tucker Act, a landowner can seek judicial review of the agency's
decision to deny the permit. The Corps' denial of a permit and the EPA's exercise of its veto power
under section 404 constitute final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.
If the applicant prevails, the agency action will be reversed and the application will be granted or
remanded to the agency for further consideration. See E. Manning Seltzer & Robert E. Steinberg,
Wetlands and Private Development, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 159, 181 (1987)
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(i) (1988). This court was originally known as the United States Court
of Claims. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 22, 10 Stat. 612 (1855). In 1982, Congress reorganized the
court and changed its name to the claims court. Federal Courts Improvement Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-
77 (1988). The claims court was renamed the United States Court of Federal Claims in 1992. See
Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, § 902, Pub. L. No.
102-572, Title IX, 106 Stat. 4516 (1992). Parties may appeal claims court decisions to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988). The Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear such appeals and that court's decisions are binding upon the claims
court. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct, 381, 388 (1988).
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Deltona Corporation v. United States,256 decided in 1981, was one
of the first cases in which a landowner sought compensation from the
federal government for denial of a section 404 dredge and fill permit.
Deltona purchased a 10,000-acre parcel of land on Marco Island on the
Florida Gulf Coast in 1964.7 The property contained large areas of
dense mangrove vegetation."5 8 According to Deltona's master plan, the
proposed development was to be completed in five stages. The areas, in
order of scheduled completion, were Marco River, Roberts Bay, Collier
Bay, Barfield Bay and Big Key. 9 When fully completed, the Marco Is-
land was expected to have more than 12,000 single-family residences as
well as multifamily structures, shopping centers, marinas and other facili-
ties.' However, in order to increase the amount of waterfront property
available for development, Deltona planned to create numerous "finger
fills," a process that would require considerable dredging and filling."
The Corps granted a dredge and fill permit for the first and second
phases of the Marco Island development in 1964 and 1969.2 Deltona sought
permits for its three remaining areas in 1973. 3 The Corps granted a permit
for the Collier Bay area in 1976, but denied permit applications for Barfield
Bay and Big Key.2' The Corps denied Deltona's permit applications because
it felt that the proposed development would destroy mangrove forests in these
areas. 5 After an unsuccessful appeal of the Corps' decision,' Deltona
brought a claim for compensation in the Court of Claims.
While declining to adopt any specific takings test, the court focused
on economic impact and frustration of investment-backed expectations.
Citing Penn Central, the court stated that mere diminution in value was
not enough to establish a taking. 7 Instead, the court declared, it must
determine if any reasonable uses were permitted by the regulation., 8 In
addition, the court determined that it must look to the regulation's effect
on the parcel as a whole.269 Turning to the case at hand, the court ob-
256. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. CI. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
257. 657 F.2d at 1188.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1188-89.
265. Id. at 1189.
266. See Deltona v. Alexander, 504 F. Supp. 1280 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
267. Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1191.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1192.
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served that the areas affected, Barfield Bay and Big Key, included only 20
percent of the acreage that Deltona had purchased in 1964.70 Further-
more, Barfield Bay and Big Key contained 111 acres of uplands which
were not affected by the Corps' denial of dredge and fill permits. Ac-
cording to the court, these upland areas were now worth more than twice
what Deltona paid for the entire Barfield Bay and Big Key areas in
1964.271 The court, therefore, concluded that economic impact of the
permit denial on Deltona was not sufficient to constitute a taking.2
Deltona also argued that unforeseen changes in the Corps' dredge and
fill permit program made it impossible for Deltona "to capitalize upon a
reasonable investment-backed expectation which it had every justification to
rely upon until the law began to change."273 The court, however, observed
that when it acquired the property in 1964, Deltona was aware that it would
have to obtain dredge and fill permits from the Corps and that the standards
and conditions governing the issuance of these permits might change in the
future.274 Deltona also contended that its investment-backed expectations were
frustrated because it had already entered into contracts of sale for approxi-
mately 90 percent of the lots in Barfield Bay and Big Key.'7 However, the
court was unimpressed with this argument and chastised Deltona for entering
into contracts of sale before obtaining the permits that would be necessary for
it to develop the land." 6 Therefore, Deltona's claim for compensation was
firmly rejected. 277
Jentgen v. United States278 was decided by the Court of Claims on
the same day as Deltona. In 1971, Jentgen purchased a 100-acre tract
near the Everglades National Park for $150,000. 2 Jentgen planned to
develop the site as a water-oriented residential community. About 80
acres of the tract were wetlands, while the remaining 20 acres were
upland.' The developer applied for a section 404 dredge and fill permit
in 1975. However, the Corps denied the application, largely because the
project would harm mangrove wetlands located on the property. 2s  Jentgen
270. Id.
271. Id. The court stated that Deltona paid $1.24 million for Barfield Bay and Big Key in 1964.
In 1981, the upland portions of these tracts were worth $2.5 million. Id.
272. Id. at 1192-93.
273. Id. at 1191.
274. Id. at 1193.
275. Id. at 1189.
276. Id. at 1194.
277. Id.
278. 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
279. Id. at 1211.
280. Id. at 1212.
281. Id.
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rejected an offer to allow development on 20 acres covered by the appli-
cation and instead brought suit in the Court of Claims.m Jentgen con-
tended that he had been deprived of all economically viable use of his
property and, therefore, had suffered a taking as a consequence of the
permit denial .283 The court, however, rejected this argument, observing
that Jentgen could still develop 40 acres of his 100-acre tract. ' Further-
more, the court observed, even after the permit application was denied,
the property was still worth between $80,000 and $150,000.' The court
concluded that the property had not suffered sufficient diminution in value
to establish a takings claim.8
The landowner in Ciampitti v. United States'8 also failed to con-
vince the court that he was entitled to compensation. The property in
question was located in the Diamond Beach area of Lower Township,
New Jersey. 88 In 1980, Ciampitti bought 42 lots from Diamond Beach
Venture Associates (DBVA) for $32,000. Shortly thereafter, he sold these
lots for $303,700. Ciampitti then purchased another 82 lots from DBVA
for $150,000. Most of these lots were eventually improved and sold to a
developer named Conklin. None of the lots involved in these first two
purchases were located in wetland areas. During the next two years,
Ciampitti acquired an additional 21 lots from DBVA for a total price of
$31,000. Most of these lots were in state-designated wetland areas.2 9 In
1983, Ciampitti purchased another 45 acres (about 23 blocks) of undevel-
oped land from DBVA for $3.3 million. 14 acres of this property, located
on the western or inland side of the island, were state-designated
wetlands. At the time of this last purchase, Ciampitti had obtained a com-
mitment from Siana & DiDonato (DiDonato), another developer, to pur-
chase four eastern or ocean side blocks for $3 million. DiDonato subse-
quently obtained an option to purchase another two blocks on the eastern
side of Diamond beach for $1.6 million. DiDonato eventually exercised
both of these options.29
282. Id. Jentgen did not seek judicial review of the permit denial under the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
283. Id. at 1213.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1214.
287. 22 CI. Ct. 310 (1991).
288. id. at 311. Lower Township is located on a barrier island near the extreme southern coast of
New Jersey. Lower Township includes the beach, upland and marsh areas between Wildwood Crest on the
north and Cape May city on the South. The western portion of Diamond Beach adjoins an area of marsh
and open water known as Jarvis Sound, which separates the island from the mainland. Id.
289. Id. at 312. Most of the state-designated wetlands were located in the western or inland area
of Diamond Beach. Id.
290. Id. at 312-13.
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In 1983, Ciampitti applied to the Corps for permission to fill eleven
blocks of his property and to dredge an area for a marina.29' The area
involved amounted to about 18 acres. The Corps denied the permit in
1986 because Ciampitti's project was inconsistent with the state's Coastal
Zone Management Program and because he had failed to obtain a dredge
and fill permit from the state. 92 Ciampitti then brought suit in the claims
court to obtain compensation for an alleged taking. The court considered
the economic impact of the permit denial and the extent to which it in-
terfered with Ciampitti's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 293
At trial, appraisers for both parties agreed that the wetlands area was
commercially unmarketable in its existing condition.2' However, the
government also claimed that the upland portion of Ciampitti's property
was now worth $14 million.2' The government argued that the court
should consider the economic impact of the permit denial on the entire
tract, while Ciampitti maintained that it should focus solely on the proper-
ty that was involved in the permit application.29 The court declared that
such factors as the degree of contiguity, dates of acquisition, whether the
parcel had been treated as a single unit, and whether the protected lands
would enhance the value of the remaining property were all relevant to
this issue. 2" The court then concluded that the eastern and western parts
of Diamond Beach were "inextricably linked in terms of purchase and
financing" since Ciampitti purchased the eastern portion solely in order to
acquire and pay for the western portion of the property.298 Since the up-
land portion of Ciampitti's property was still worth $14 million, the court
concluded that the economic impact of the permit denial was not serious
enough to constitute a taking.'
The court also ruled that the permit denial did not interfere with
Ciampitti's reasonable investment-backed expectations. The court noted
that Ciampitti was well aware of the difficulties of developing in wetland
areas and had carefully avoided purchasing state-designated wetland areas
when he first began to acquire property in the area."c Apparently, the on-
291. Id. at 315-16. Ciampitti applied for a permit only after the Corps obtained a preliminary
injunction to prevent him from continuing any further unauthorized dredge and fill operations on his
property. See United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 499 (D.N.J. 1984).
292. Id. at 316.
293. Id. at 318.
294. Id. at 317.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 318-19.
297. Id. at 318.
298. Id. at 319.
299. Id. at 320.
300. Id. at 321.
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ly reason Ciampitti purchased wetland property was his mistaken belief
that riparian grants from the state to some of his predecessors in title
would immunize him from state and federal regulation. 30' The court,
however, declared that Ciampitti's reliance on these riparian grants was
completely unreasonable and that he had ample warning prior to his pur-
chase of the property that state and federal officials might deny permis-
sion to develop the wetlands portion of his property. 3° Consequently, the
court rejected Ciampitti's investment-backed expectations argument.3'3
Not all takings claims, however, were unsuccessful prior to the
Lucas decision, as 1902 Atlantic Limited v. Hudson3'4 and Formanek v.
United States305 illustrate. 1902 Atlantic Limited was the first case in
which a federal court ruled that denial of a permit by the Corps, if al-
lowed to stand, would constitute a taking." The landowner in 1981 for a
section 404 permit to fill an borrow pit in the City of Chesapeake, Vir-
ginia.3 7 The borrow pit, which consisted of eleven acres of sand and mud
flat bottom area, contained less than three quarters of an acre of
wetlands.308 The borrow pit was triangular in shape and was completely
contained within the embankments of three manmade structures. 3° An
industrial fertilizer plant, an oil refinery, a coal fired power station, and
an automobile junkyard were located in the immediate area. 310 The land-
owner intended to convert the borrow pit to upland so that it could be
used as an industrial site. tt
The landowner applied to the Corps for a dredge and fill, but the Corps
denied the application because 32,000 square feet of wetland would be de-
stroyed, the creation of an industrial site was not a water-dependent activity,
and alternative upland sites were available for the project.3"2 The landowner
301. Id. at 321.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 321-22.
304. 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983).
305. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
306. See Seltzer & Steinberg, supra note 254, at 195.
307. Arlanric Limited, 574 F. Supp. at 1384.
308. Id. The borrow pit was created in 1954 when the site was excavated to provide fill for the
creation of a bypass. Later, someone dug a ditch from Mill Dam Creek to the pit, thereby causing it
to be periodically inundated by tidal flow from the creek. As a result of this inundation, saltwater
wetland vegetation grew up along the fringe of the pit on two sides. Id.
309. Id. The northwestern side of the borrow pit was bordered by a railroad embankment.
Military Highway, a four-lane limited-access divided highway, enclosed the south side of the pit, and
the northeast side of the pit was located next to Interstate Highway 464. The site could only be en-
tered from Military Highway. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1385.
312. Id.
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then brought suit, contending that the Corps had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously, abused its discretion, and otherwise failed to act in accordance with
law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.313 The landowner also
claimed that the Corps' denial of its permit application destroyed all of the
property's value, thereby causing a taking.3"4
The landowner conceded that the wetlands in the borrow pit were
subject to the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act,315 but alleged that the Corps had placed excessive weight on the
water dependency requirement and had failed to engage in any meaningful
balancing of other costs and benefits when it reviewed the permit applica-
tion.316 The court agreed with this allegation and concluded that the
Corps' conduct was arbitrary and capricious.317
The landowner also argued that the Corps' action amounted to a
regulatory taking of its property.3"' In its discussion of the taking issue,
the court relied primarily on the Agins formula, with particular emphasis
on the "no viable economic use" factor.3t9 The court determined that the
borrow pit in its present condition was commercially worthless.3" In the
court's view, the denial of all viable economic use of the landowner's
property was sufficient to constitute a taking without regard to any other
consideration.32  However, the court conceded that the landowner must
bring suit in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act if it desired to
seek compensation from the federal government."2
313. Id. at 1384-85.
314. Id. at 1384.
315. Id. at 1393. However, the landowner successfully argued that waters within the borrow pit
were not "navigable waters" and thus subject to the Corps' jurisdiction under section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act even though they were subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Id. at 1393-96.
316. Id. at 1397.
317. Id. at 1403-04. The court remanded the case to the Corps for reconsideration. The Corps,
however, again refused to grant a permit. After further litigation, the Corps finally issued a permit in
1986. See 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575, 577 (1992).
318. Atlantic Limited, 574 F. Supp. at 1404.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1405.
321. Id. The court also rejected the Corps' claim that no compensation was required because the
waters of the borrow pit were subject to the federal government's navigation servitude. Id. at 1405-06. The
navigation servitude doctrine provides that the federal government does not have to compensate landowners
whose property is injured when it exercises its power over navigable waters under the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Grande River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960) (federal government not
liable to owner of fast lands for water power rights); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 350 U.S.
499, 509-10 (1945) (federal government not required to pay owner of hydroelectric dam for reduction in
water flow caused by construction of flood control project).
322. 574 F. Supp. at 1406-07. The landowner chose to seek a permit from the Corps rather than pur-
suing its claim for compensation in the Court of Claims. However, the landowner later argued unsuccessful-
ly that the delay in issuing the permit constituted a temporary taking. 1902 Atlantic Ltd., 26 Cl. Ct. at 582.
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The plaintiff in Formanek v. United States32 chose this latter alterna-
tive after being denied a dredge and fill permit by the Corps. The land-
owner in Formanek owned an undivided interest in a tract of land in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.3 Twelve acres were upland,
while the remaining ninety-nine acres were wetlands.3"2 Forty-five acres
of Formanek's wetland property were located in the Savage Fen Wetland
Complex, a rare wetland plant community.326 Although the Formanek's
property qualified for a nationwide general permit, the Corps ruled that
landowners whose property lay within the Fen must apply for an individu-
al permit if they wished to dredge or fill.3 7 Formanek applied for an
individual permit in 1985 to place fill material on the property to build an
access road, but his application was promptly denied. 3 8 Rather than
appealing the permit denial, the plaintiff brought suit against the govern-
ment in the claims court.
The court in Formanek focused almost entirely on the economic
impact of the permit denial on the plaintiffs property. 31 As part of its
analysis, the court declared that it must compare the value of the property
before and after the permit denial.3 Formanek claimed that the property
was worth $1.2 million if used for an industrial site, based on its location,
access to highways, and existing zoning.33" ' The government contended the
Corps' action did not lower the value of Formanek's property because the
state Department of Natural Resources would never grant the necessary
permits. 332 The court rejected this contention, however, pointing out that
state authorities had not yet made any attempt to assert jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's land.33 The court found that the property was suitable for
use as an industrial site and that there was no market for the property
unless it could be filled.3"4 The court estimated the value of the property
prior to the permit denial at about $934,000 and its value after the permit
denial at essentially zero.335 According to the court, a reduction in value
323. 26 CI. Ct. 332 (1992).
324. Id. at 333.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 334.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 335. The court also mentioned interference with investment-backed expectations as a
consideration, but did only briefly discussed this issue in its opinion. Id. at 335, 341.
330. Id. at 335.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 336.
333. Id. at 336-37.
334. Id. at 339-40.
335. Id. at 340.
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of this magnitude was sufficient to constitute a taking.336 Accordingly, the
court awarded the landowner the full amount of the property's estimated
value prior to the permit denial.337
IV. POST-LUCAS TAKINGS CASES
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,33 the Supreme Court
made it clear that complete deprivation of economic use was sufficient,
standing alone, to constitute a regulatory taking.339 During the short peri-
od that has elapsed since Lucas was decided, the Court's "total takings"
analysis has had a significant impact in several decisions involving
wetland protection regulations.
A. The Lucas Decision
In 1986, the plaintiff in Lucas purchased two unimproved beachfront
lots on the Isle of Palms near Charleston, South Carolina for $975,000. ° All
of the surrounding landowners had constructed single-family homes on their
property and Lucas intended to do the same. At the time Lucas purchased the
property, neither lot was subject to regulation under the existing Coastal
Management Act." t However, because the shoreline along this property had
fluctuated significantly over the past forty years, 3' 2 the statute required that a
construction setback line be established some distance landward of the Lucas
property. 3? Because of the location of the construction setback line, the
336. Id. at 340-41.
337. Id. at 341. The court also ordered the plaintiff to convey the property to the United States
upon payment of the judgment. Id.
338. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
339. Id. at 2893 ("The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropri-
ate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.").
340. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
341. Id. at 2989-90. South Carolina's original shoreline regulation statute, enacted in 1977,
required landowners to obtain permits from the Coastal Council before building homes or other struc-
tures in "critical areas," which included beaches and primary sand dunes. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-
10(J) (1987). Consequently, the 1977 Act gave the Coastal Council no control over residential devel-
opment landward of existing beaches. In 1987, a Blue Ribbon Committee established by the Coastal
Council to study erosion control, recommended a setback program that would move development
sufficiently inland that residential structures would not be threatened by the natural erosion cycle. See
Newman J. Smith, Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Carolina, 42 S.C.
L. REV. 717, 720 (1991). This suggestion led to the enactment of the 1988 Beachfront Management
Act. 1988 S.C. Acts 607, codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10, 48-39-130, and 48-39-270 to 48-
39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
342. John R. Nolon, Private Property Investment, Lucas and the Fairness Doctrine, 10 PACt
ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 49 (1992).
343. The 1988 Act provided for the establishment of a "baselines" in coastal regions. The Act distin-
guished between standard erosion zones and inlet erosion zones. A starxiard erosion zone was defined as a
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statute effectively prohibited Lucas from building a structure on either lot
except for a small deck or walkway.3" Lucas brought suit against the state,
alleging that the statutory restriction constituted a taking of his property
without just compensation. The trial court found in his favor and awarded
Lucas more than $1.2 million.345
This decision was reversed on appeal by the South Carolina Supreme
Court.' Although the court acknowledged that economic impact was as a
relevant factor, 7 it chose to rely on the noxious use theory which up-
holds regulation without compensation when the state acts in order to
prevent a serious harm to the public. 48 The South Carolina court ob-
served that the landowner had not challenged the Beachfront Management
Act's legislative findings that new construction causes serious public
harm.349 For this reason, the court concluded that Lucas had implicitly
conceded that the proposed use would be harmful and thus fall within the
noxious use no compensation rule.35 Accordingly, the court ruled that
segment of shoreline that was subject to the same set of coastal processes, had a fairly constant range of
profiles and sediment characteristics, and was not influenced directly by tidal inlets or associated inlet shoals.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-270(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). The Act defined an inlet erosion zone as a
segment of shoreline along or adjacent to a tidal inlet that was directly influenced by the inlet and the inlet's
associated shoals. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-270(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). The property in Lucas was
located in an inlet erosion zone. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.1.
Ordinarily, the baseline in the standard erosion zone would be located along the crest of the
primary oceanfront sand dune in that area. However, if the shoreline was altered, either naturally or
because of artificial structures, the baseline was to be placed where the crest of the primary
oceanfront sand dunes would have been if the shoreline had not been altered. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-
39-280(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Where inlets had not been stabilized by jetties, groins, or
other structures, the baseline was to be located at the most landward point of any erosion in the last
forty years unless the best available scientific and historical data indicated that the shoreline was un-
likely to return to its former location. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
Once a baseline was established in a coastal area, the 1988 Act directed the Coastal Council to
establish a construction setback line landward of the baseline. This setback line would be either forty times
the annual erosion rate or twenty feet, which ever was greater. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(B) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1993). The Act generally prohibited the construction of habitable structures seaward of the setback
line. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Normal repairs were allowed, but a structure
that had been completely destroyed could only be replaced if certain conditions were met. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(iv) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Furthermore, no damaged structure could be recon-
stnucted seaward of the baseline. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(iv) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
Finally, new erosion control structures were banned outright by the Act and replacement of damaged struc-
tures was severely restricted. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(3)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
344. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
345. id.
346. Id. at 902.
347. Id. at 899.
348. Id.
349. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (indicating development sited
too close to beach/dune system jeopardizes the stability of this system, accelerates erosion, and endan-
gers adjacent property).
350. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900.
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Lucas was not entitled to compensation even though the regulation de-
prived him of all economically viable use of his property.35" '
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision, however, was re-
versed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court.352 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia set forth a new "categorical rule" to govern regu-
latory takings.3"3 The Court identified two types of regulatory action
where balancing was not permitted: the first involved physical invasions
or appropriations of private property,354 while the second consisted of
cases in which a regulation denied the landowner all economically benefi-
cial or productive use of the land.355 The Court reasoned that a regulation
that allowed no economically beneficial use was like a physical appropria-
tion and, therefore, should be treated similarly.356 In Lucas, since the state
had conceded that the regulation completely destroyed the economic value
of the beachfront lots, the Court concluded that compensation was re-
quired under the second categorical rule.357
Finally, the Lucas Court declared that when the government de-
prived a landowner of all economically beneficial use, it could avoid
liability only by showing that the interest destroyed was not part of the
landowner's title.358 In other words, any limitations on land use that re-
lieved the government of the duty to compensate "must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.""' The Court
warned that common-law principles would seldom, if ever, prevent all
construction or improvement on a landowner's property." In addition,
the Court declared that the state could not simply cite legislative findings
351. Id. at 902.
352. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
353. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Thomas. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but preferred to decide the case by using an
investment-backed expectations rationale. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens each wrote a dissent-
ing opinion and Justice Souter issued a separate statement on the question of ripeness.
354. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 ("The first encompasses regulations that compel the property
owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property.").
355. Id. ("The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is
where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.").
356. Id. at 2894 ("Motal deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view,
the equivalent of a physical appropriation.').
357. Id. at 2893-94.
358. Id. at 2899 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land if all economi-
cally beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his tide to
begin with."). Justice Stevens labeled this as the "nuisance exception." Id. at 2920.
359. Id. at 2900.
360. Id. at 2901.
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or make conclusionary applications of common-law maxims in order to
sustain the regulation. 36' In effect, the state would have to show that
construction of a house on the beachfront property would constitute a
common-law nuisance. 362 The Court then remanded the case back to the
South Carolina court to determine whether the proposed construction of
residential structures seaward of the setback line could be prohibited
under background principles of state nuisance or property law.363 On
remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that no state com-
mon-law nuisance or property doctrines justified a regulatory taking of the
Lucas property without compensation.3 4
Thus, under "total taking" inquiry proposed by Lucas, the land-
owner makes out a prima facie case for compensation if the court finds
that the regulation deprives the landowner of all economically benefi-
cial use of the land. To avoid liability, the government must prove that
the restriction imposed on the landowner by the regulation merely
replicates a restriction that already existed under background principles
of state property or nuisance law.
B. State Takings Cases
At the present time, only a few state courts have considered the
effect of the Lucas decision on wetland takings claims. One recent case,
Lopes v. City of Peabody," discussed Lucas in general terms, but re-
manded the case to a lower court to resolve the takings issue involved.3"
The property in question, a quarter-acre lot located in Peabody, Massa-
chusetts, was bounded on the south by a railroad right of way, on the east
by a public road, and on the west and north by Devil's Dishful Pond. 7
Virtually the entire lot had been placed within a wetlands conservancy
district under the provisions of a city zoning ordinance because its eleva-
tion was less than 88.5 feet.368 The landowner alleged, without contradic-
361. Id.
362. Id. at 2901-02.
363. Id. ("Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law
action for public nuisance. South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and prop-
erty law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found.").
364. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
365. 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994).
366. See also Zerhetz v. Municipality of Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1993), which
held that the mere designation of the landowner's property as "conservation wetlands" did not
constitute a regulatory taking, cited the Lucas case in a footnote, but did not attempt to apply it
to the facts. Id. at 782 n.5.
367. Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1313.
368. Id.
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tion, that the ordinance effectively prohibited him from constructing a res-
idence on the property.369 Nevertheless, both the Land Court and the Ap-
peals Court upheld the validity of the ordinance.37 After the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied further review,37" ' Lopes petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court grant-
ed the writ, but remanded the case to the appeals court for further consid-
eration in light of the Lucas decision.3" At this point, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court undertook to review the Lopes case.
According to the court, under Lucas, a regulatory taking would
occur if the ordinance stripped the land of all economically beneficial use
unless the restriction was consistent with established principles of nui-
sance or property law.3" The court the declared that the case should be
remanded to the Land Court to determine if the ordinance's 88.5-foot
minimum elevation was higher than necessary to achieve legitimate gov-
ernmental objectives. 3  However, even if the Land Court found that the
ordinance advanced legitimate state interests, it would be required under
Lucas to invalidate the ordinance, as applied to the Lopes property, if it
concluded that the restriction on development deprived the landowner of
all economically beneficial use.375
In Mock v. Department of Environmental Resources,376 a Pennsylva-
nia court held that landowners who were denied a permit to dredge and
fill failed to establish a takings claim under the Lucas rationale.3" The
land in question consisted of 5.2 acres located along a highway in Bucks
County, Pennsylvania.378 The Mocks purchased the property, which con-
tained 3.94 acres of wetlands, in 1963. 379 In 1988, they applied to the
Department of Environmental Resources for a permit to fill .87 acres of
wetlands in order to construct an auto repair shop on the lot.3" The De-
partment, however, refused to grant the permit because it felt that the
proposed development would be detrimental to the environment.38' On ap-
369. Id. at 1313-14.
370. Lopes v. City of Peabody, 595 N.E.2d 812 (Mass. Ct. App. 1992).
371. Lopes v. City of Peabody, 600 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1992).
372. See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 113 S. Ct. 1574 (1993).
373. Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1315-16. However, the court also pointed out that Lopes did not
make a claim for compensation, but rather challenged the validity of the regulation. Id. at 1314.
374. Id. at 1316.
375. Id.
376. 623 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1993).
377. Id. at 941.
378. Id. at 942.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 942-43.
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peal, the landowners claimed that Lucas was applicable because their
property was essentially worthless in its present condition.3u While the
court agreed with the plaintiffs' allegation, it determined that Lucas was
not controlling. Unlike the situation in Lucas, where the statute prohibited
all construction seaward of the setback line, the regulatory agency in
Mock did not rule out the possibility of a permit if the landowners submit-
ted a new proposal.383
C. Federal Takings Cases
In three recent cases, federal courts have relied on Lucas, at least to
some extent, to resolve takings claims involving wetlands.3" The first case,
Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States~a involved a temporary takings claim. The
property owner in Tabb Lakes intended to create a residential subdivision on
a 167-acre tract of land in York County, Virginia .31 Construction work on
the project began in 1984. In 1986, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
discovered that some of the property contained wetlands and ordered the
plaintiff to apply for a section 404 permit.3 7 After a series of negotiations
with the Corps, the plaintiff withdrew its permit application and obtained a
declaratory judgment in federal court that the property was not subject to the
Corps' jurisdiction. 388 Later, the plaintiff brought suit in the claims court,
seeking damages for the alleged temporary taking of its property between
October, 1986, when the Corps issued a cease and desist order against fur-
ther construction activities on the land, and December, 1989, the date on
which the court of appeal's decision in favor of the plaintiff became final.
389
The claims court discussed the Lucas case and concluded that it authorized
compensation for regulatory takings even though the landowner's loss was
not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the categorical rule.3' However,
the court concluded that no taking had occurred because the plaintiff con-
tinued to sell upland lots during the period involved and because the delay
caused by the Corps' actions was not extraordinary.39'
382. Id. at 946.
383. Id. at 947.
384. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10
F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
385. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
386. Id. at 798.
387. Id.
388. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 885
F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
389. Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 CI. Ct. 1334 (1992).
390. Id. at 1350-51.
391. Id. at 1357.
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This decision was affirmed by the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals." 9 Tabb Lakes argued that a taking existed at the time that the
Corps issued its cease and desist order, and that sales and other events
after that date could have no bearing on whether a taking had occurred,
but were only relevant to the issue of damages or to the question of when
the taking ended.393 While agreeing with the plaintiff's underlying theory,
the court declared that it must determine whether the cease and desist
order actually interfered with the plaintiffs property sufficiently to consti-
tute a taking. 31 The court observed that the cease and desist order did not
prevent the plaintiff from obtaining permission from the Corps to develop
his property at some future time. 3" Furthermore, the court refused to
limit itself to a consideration of the order's economic effect on lots that
were subjected to a ban on development. 31 Instead, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's "parcel as a whole" analysis39 to look at the entire
development. This led the court to conclude that the plaintiff's land did
not lose all viable economic use during the period of Tabb Lakes' dispute
with the Corps because the plaintiff continued to develop and sell lots
from other portions of its property during that period.39 Finally, the court
of appeals rejected the plaintiff's claim that a temporary taking occurred
as a result of delays in the permitting process.'"
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States' the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the economic effect of a permit denial on the
value of the plaintiff's wetland property. In 1972, the plaintiff purchased
a 1,560-acre wetland parcel in Dade County, Florida.4" Florida Rock
intended to mine the underlying limestone, a process that would have
destroyed the wetlands.0 The purchase price for the entire tract was
$2,964,000 or about $1900 per acre.403 In 1979, Florida Rock applied to
the Corps for a permit to conduct mining operations on 98 acres of its
property.4 However, the Corps denied the application. The court of
392. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
393. Id. at 800.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 800-01.
396. Id. at 802.
397. Id. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Const. Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264,
2290 (1993); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
398. Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 802.
399. Id. at 802-03.
400. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
401. Id. at 1562.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. Florida Rock initially began mining on its property without obtaining the requisite
permit. The Corps discovered this and issued a cease and desist order in 1978. After restoring the
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appeals concluded that "the proposed mining would cause irremediable
loss of an ecologically valuable wetland parcel and would create unde-
sirable water turbidity." °5 At this point, Florida Rock filed suit against
the United States, alleging that the permit denial amounted to a regulatory
taking of its property. °6
The claims court found that rock mining was the only viable eco-
nomic use available to the landowner.' 7 This use, however, was fore-
closed as a result of the Corps' denial of the necessary permit.' s There-
fore, the court reasoned, the government's action had caused Florida
Rock's property to become virtually worthless. 4'9 The court also firmly
rejected the government's contention that "compensation need never be
paid where an activity is prohibited that has been 'found by Congress to
be detrimental to the public welfare." 41" In particular, the court disagreed
with the proposition that plaintiff's proposed discharge constituted pollu-
tion merely because all discharges were defined as such by section 404.
Instead, the court insisted that the government must prove that Florida
Rock's proposed mining operations would actually cause a significant
amount of pollution. 41' The government offered evidence that limestone
mining would contaminate the Biscayne Aquifer, but the court remained
unpersuaded.4 t2 The government also claimed that plaintiff's proposed
mining would destroy habitat and food chain resources that were depen-
dent upon the wetland. 413 According to the government, the plaintiff had
no right to deprive the public of these values by destroying the wetland
environment; consequently, the government should not have to pay com-
pensation when it acted to preserve these existing amenities for the pub-
land as best it could, Florida Rock applied for a permit to mine its entire tract. The Corps, however,
informed Florida Rock that it would only issue permits for parcels no larger than that necessary to
permit three years of mining. In this case, the Corps estimated that a 98-acre parcel would be suffi-
cient and Florida Rock amended its permit accordingly. Id. at 1562-63.
405. Id. at 1563.
406. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 164 (1985).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 169.
411. Id. at 171.
412. Id. at 172-75. The government claimed that the peat or muck layer, located immediately
above the limestone rock at the bottom of the marsh, filtered out chemicals, heavy metals and pesti-
cides that would otherwise enter the aquifer. According to the government, mining operations would
remove this peat layer and thereby expose the aquifer to contamination from these substances. Id. at
172. The government also contended that limestone mining would create deep water pools which
would facilitate the release of heavy metals into the aquifer. Id. at 173. Finally, the government ar-
gued that rock mining caused contamination of the aquifer by allowing pollutants from surface sourc-
es direct access to the aquifer. Id. at 174.
413. Id. at 175-76.
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lic.414 The claims court, however, disagreed41 and concluded that a regu-
latory taking had occurred when the Corps denied Florida Rock's permit
application in 1980.416 In a subsequent proceeding, the court awarded
Florida Rock $1,029,000 for loss of the 98 acres.
417
The claims court's decision, however, was vacated by the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals. 418 The court declared that neither Florida Rock
nor the claims court could dispute the Corps' finding that the proposed
mining activities would cause water pollution in a proceeding under the
Tucker Act since the Corps would have no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
property under section 404 unless its activities produced at least some
pollution. 419 The court of appeals then addressed the takings claim. It
stated that the three-factor test set forth in Penn Central and Connolly was
the most appropriate approach to apply in regulatory takings cases.42
Like the claims court, the court of appeals focused primarily on the
permit denial's economic impact on Florida Rock's property. However,
the court of appeals disagreed with the lower court's method of calculat-
ing the residual value of Florida Rock's property. The claims court had
assumed that the property was worthless unless it could be used for min-
ing because it was too far away from urban areas to be suitable for resi-
dential use at the present time." The court of appeals, on the other hand,
declared that the residual value of Florida Rock's property was not lim-
ited to the land's value for immediate use, but must be based on fair
market value, a concept that would take into account the present value of
potential future uses of the property.422 Fair market value was determined
by what a "willing buyer" would pay a willing seller for the property at
the time the permit was denied. 42 According to the court, Florida Rock's
property might still have considerable market value to land speculators
414. Id. at 176.
415. Id. at 176-77.
416. Id. at 179.
417. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The award
was conditioned upon Florida Rock's agreeing to convey the 98 acres in question to the federal
government. Id.
418. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
419. Id. at 899. According to the court, the Tucker Act only authorized compensation for valid
governmental conduct. If the Corps had no jurisdiction because Florida Rock's activities would not
cause pollution, the claims court would have no jurisdiction over the matter and the plaintiff would be
required to challenge the Corps' action in a federal district court. Id. at 899.
420. Id. at 900-01. The court also noted that the government had abandoned its earlier claim
that the "noxious use" test should be applied. Id. at 900.
421. Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164.
422. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 903.
423. The court conceded, however, that a "willing buyer" must be one who is correctly in-
formed about the physical character of the land, as well as legal restrictions on its use. Id. at 902.
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who were prepared to gamble that they could obtain permits from the
Corps at some future date to develop the property for commercial or resi-
dential purposes.'
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the government's contention
that there was no taking because only 98 acres of the original 1560-acre
tract were affected by the permit denial. The court acknowledged that this
argument had prevailed in Deltona and Jentgen, but observed that in those
cases the Corps had allowed the remaining property to be developed,
while in this case, the Corps' denial of Florida Rock's present application
strongly indicated that it would prohibit the landowner from mining on
any of its property 2.4  The case was remanded to the claims court to de-
termine the fair market value of Florida Rock's property immediately
after the permit denial.426
On remand, the claims court reaffirmed its earlier determination that
Florida Rock's property was worth $10,500 an acre prior to denial of its
permit application. 27 Witnesses for the government, relying on sales of
comparable property in the area, testified that Florida Rock's land had a
fair market value for investment purposes of $4000 an acre even after
denial of the permit.428 Plaintiff's experts, on the other hand, claimed that
there was no market for such property among knowledgeable investors,
that its highest and best use after the permit denial was as a government-
owned site for "future recreational/water management purposes," and that
its fair market value was no more than $500 per acre.429 The court agreed
with the plaintiff's approach and declared that a valuation based on evi-
dence of comparable sales was not relevant unless the government could
show that the buyers of such property were knowledgeable about the
existing regulatory environment.430 Accepting the plaintiffs valuation at
face value, the court concluded that a diminution in value from $10,500
to $500 per acre was sufficient to constitute a taking.43'
Once again, the government appealed.432 Since Lucas had been
decided in the interim, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exam-
424. Id. at 902-03.
425. Id. at 904.
426. Id. at 905.
427. Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 169.
428. Id. at 172.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 174.
431. Id. at 175-76.
432. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Both the opin-
ion in this case, and the most recent court of appeals opinion in Loveladies Harbor, were written by
Judge S. Jay Plager, a former law professor, and a well-known authority on water law.
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ined the Supreme Court opinion to see if it controlled the disposition of
the Florida Rock case. First, the court of appeals disagreed with the
claims court's decision to exclude evidence based on comparable sales
unless it could be affirmatively shown that the buyers were fully informed
about the regulatory situation. The court declared that detailed knowledge
of existing regulations was only relevant to buyers who were intending to
make some immediate use of the property. Market prices, however, might
also be set by speculators who were interested in future development and,
therefore, were not concerned about current restrictions on the
property.4 Therefore, the court reasoned, it was improper for the lower
court to ignore price data generated by the vigorous speculative market
that in fact existed for land like that owned by Florida Rock.4' Since the
claims court had not correctly calculated the residual value of Florida
Rock's property, its conclusion that the Corps' action was a "categorical"
taking of all economic use of the land could not be upheld.435 Once again,
the court remanded the case to the claims court to determine, under the
proper valuation formula, if Lucas's categorical taking rule was applicable
to Florida Rock's property.436
The court of appeals went on to discuss how the claims court should
proceed if it concluded that the categorical rule did not apply-that is, if
the permit denial merely amounted to a "partial" rather than a "total"
deprivation of the property's economic value.437 The court acknowledged
that the Lucas decision did not provide a clear answer to this question.43
Nevertheless, the court concluded that compensation for partial takings
was justified in appropriate cases. 439 The problem with partial takings,
according to the court, was that there was no bright line rule to distin-
guish compensable partial takings from noncompensable diminutions in
value." 0 Consequently, the only way to decide such cases was to balance
competing private and governmental interests."'
The court of appeals mentioned a number of factors that should be
considered in a partial takings case. The first was reciprocity of advantage, 442
a principle that did not seem particularly applicable to the situation in Florida
433. Id. at 1565-66.
434. Id. at 1567.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1568.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1570.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 1570-71.
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Rock. The character and function of the regulatory imposition was another
relevant consideration. The court declared that government should not shift
the burden of achieving a public good on to a few people, nor should it act
in a way that frustrated reasonable investment-backed expectations." 3 Finally,
the court stated that the lower court must consider any loss of economic use
to the property as well as any compensating benefits to the property owner.' 4
This approach, of course, is similar to the balancing test that the Supreme
Court set forth in Penn Central and Connolly.
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States 5 involved a 12.5-acre
parcel located in Ocean County, New Jersey. The property consisted of
one acre of filled land and 11.5 acres of wetlands.' Loveladies applied
to the Corps for a permit in 1981;'7 however, its application was denied
in 1982."' Loveladies challenged the permit denial in federal court, but
was unsuccessful.' 4 Loveladies then proceeded with an action, filed earli-
er in the claims court, seeking compensation for the permit denial."5 The
principal issue in the case was whether the Corps' action deprived the
plaintiff of all economically viable use of its land. 5 The court rejected
the proposition that the entire 250 acres should be considered in determin-
ing the economic effect of the permit denial on the plaintiff's property and
limited its inquiry to the land that was the subject of the permit applica-
tion.45 2 Furthermore, the court declared that while the regulation promot-
ed the public welfare, it did not, when balanced against the interests of
the plaintiff, clearly advance a valid governmental interest.453
The claims court devoted most of its opinion to a comparison of
the value of the plaintiff's property before and after the permit deni-
443. Id. at 1571.
444. Id.
445. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
446. Id. at 1173-74. The 12.5-acre parcel was part of a 250-acre tract that Loveladies acquired
in 1958. Loveladies developed 199 acres of this property prior the enactment of the Clean Water Act
in 1972. Id. at 1174. Loveladies originally intended to develop the remaining 51 acres. However,
after unsuccessful litigation and lengthy negotiations with the New Jersey Department of Environmen-
tal Protection, Loveladies agreed to limit its development proposal to the 12.5 acre tract in question.
See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383-84 (1988).
447. On two previous occasions, Loveladies had applied to the Corps for a permit. However,
the Corps rejected these applications because Loveladies had not obtained the necessary permits from
the Department of Environmental Protection. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Cr. at 384.
448. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1174.
449. Id.
450. Loveladics Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988).
451. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 155 (1990).
452. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 393.
453. Id. at 388-90. See also Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 160.
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al.45 The court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that the highest
and best use of its property was as the site for a 40-lot residential
development. 55 Furthermore, the court agreed that the property's fair
market value for this purpose was $2,658,000.456 Conversely, the court
found that the property had little market value after the permit deni-
al.457 The court accepted the plaintiff's allegation that there was no
chance that the Corps would grant a permit if Loveladies submitted a
revised proposal at some future time. 48 The court also agreed with the
plaintiff's claim that as a result of the permit denial, the land could
now only be used for conservation or recreational purposes. 9 The
court found that the property's market value under these circumstances
was no more than $1000 an acre.' 6 Finally, the court concluded that
the diminution in value, from $2,658,000 to $12,500, was sufficient to
qualify as a taking." 1 Accordingly, the court awarded the plaintiff
$2,658,000 plus interest from the date of the taking.' 62
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
claims court.63 The court declared that, after Lucas, a regulatory taking
occurs if: (1) there is a denial of economically viable use of the property
as a result of the regulation; (2) the property owner has distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations; and (3) the interest involved is not within the
power of the state to regulate under common-law nuisance doctrines.46
Since there was no doubt that the investment-backed expectation require-
ment was met, the court focused on the remaining two criteria.'
In its discussion of the first criterion, the court acknowledged that
under the categorical rule announced in Lucas, the government would be
required to compensate a landowner when a regulation left the property
with no economic use. However, the court also reaffirmed its holding in
Florida Rock that compensation might be required in some cases where a
regulation amounted to a partial deprivation of economically beneficial
use.466 The court then considered whether Loveladies stated a claim for a
454. Loveladies Harbor, 21 CI. Ct. at 155.
455. Id. at 157.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 160.
458. Id. at 157.
459. Id. at 159.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 160.
462. Id. at 161.
463. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1183.
464. Id. at 1179.
465. Id. at 1178.
466. Id. at 1181.
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partial or a total taking. This in turn, required the court to determine the
exact property that was adversely affected by the permit denial. ' 7
The government contended that the appropriate tract for the court to
consider in its takings analysis was the original 250-acre parcel that
Loveladies had acquired in 1958." The plaintiff, on the other hand, urged
the court to adopt a bright line rule to the effect that only property actually
subject to the permit in question would be considered. ' 9 The court, however,
opted for an approach that took several factors into account.47 One of these
factors was the timing of transfers in light of the developing regulatory envi-
ronment.47' In Loveladies' case, no attempt had been made to regulate the
property until after 199 acres of the original 250-acre tract had been devel-
oped.4' In addition, the court observed that another 38.5 acres had been
promised to the state of New Jersey in return for permission to develop the
remaining 12.5 acres.473 Consequently, the court determined that only this
remaining 12.5-acre tract could be considered in its takings analysis.47 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the categorical rule of Lucas was applicable to
Loveladies' claim because the permit denial denied the property owner all
economically feasible use of its land.47
The court then examined the third criterion-whether the "nuisance
exception" of Lucas affected Loveladies' total takings claim. First, the
court pointed out that state authorities had granted a permit to fill the 12.5
acres under consideration.476 Next, the court noted that the government
had raised the nuisance issue at trial and the claims court had found that
Loveladies' proposed development would not amount to a common-law
nuisance.4' Finally, the court observed that the state did not include in its
original conditions for development of the property any restrictions on the
filling of the 12.5-acre tract. 78 In other words, nothing in the state's
conduct indicated that it believed that filling wetlands on Loveladies'
remaining property would be a nuisance.479
467. Id. at 1180.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 1180-81. The court cited Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Cl. Ct.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), and Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d
1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991), as examples of this flexible approach.
471. Id. at 1181.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 1182.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1183.
479. Id.
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V. THE EFFECT OF LUCAS ON REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS
Some commentators maintain that the Lucas decision will have a
substantial impact on regulatory takings claims, 4" while others believe
that Lucas will eventually turn out to be a relatively unimportant case."'
This portion of the Article will examine some of the issues raised by the
Lucas decision and evaluate their possible impact on wetland-related
regulatory takings claims.
A. The Categorical "Total Takings" Rule
The categorical rule requiring the government to compensate
landowners when it imposes regulations that strip the land of all eco-
nomically beneficial use is a major contribution to the law of regulato-
ry takings. Even prior to Lucas, a number of federal courts had ac-
knowledged the validity of takings claims when wetlands regulations
destroyed the value of a landowner's property. 4 2 Lucas affirms this
480. See, e.g., John J. Delaney, Advancing Private Property Rights: The Lessons of Lucas,
22 STETSON L. REV. 395, 408 (1993) ("There is now every reason to conclude that [Lucas] will afford
greater protection for private property rights in future regulatory takings cases."); Robert M.
Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
52 MD. L. REV. 162, 164 (1993) ("In the short time since it was issued, [Lucas] has become a land-
mark addition to land use regulatory takings jurisprudence."); Paul F. Haffner, Note, Regulatory
Takings-A New Categorical Rule: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 61 U. CiN. L. REV.
1035, 1065 (1993) (" . . . the Court has developed a categorical rule which will likely cause a dra-
matic increase in the number of successful challenges to regulations of property"); Celia D. Lapidus,
Note, Constitutional Law-Takings Clause-Increasing a Landowner's Protection to Use His Land
Without Interference from the Government, 23 COMB. L. REV. 465, 482 (1993) ("Having defined the
boundaries of governmental power to regulate land use, the Lucas decision will have a significant
impact on future cases."); Jeffrey T. Palzer, Note, "Taking" Aim at Land Use Regulations: Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 525, 553 (1993) (". • •the decision in Lucas
may serve as a springboard for a new era of property rights.").
481. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of
Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council an Wetlands and
Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 67 (1995) ("Lucas, despite its rhetoric and the
Cassandra-like cries of its dissenters, may influence takings jurisprudence less than its authors in-
tended and early critics feared."); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1411, 1427 (1993) (because environmental protection laws almost never result in total eco-
nomic deprivations, categorical presumption of Lucas will rarely apply); Nolon, supra note 342, at 61
(Lucas does very little that is new and has limited applicability to the regulatory takings debate);
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1993) ("The [Lucas] case is not as far reaching as its
rhetoric suggests."); Sugameli, supra note 6, at 504 ("The [Lucas] decision does not ... offer any
practical encouragement to pro-takings advocates for whom it is indeed proving to be a case 'full of
sound and fury signifying nothing.'").
482. See Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 34041 (1992); 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hud-
son, 574 F. Supp. 1381, 1404 (E.D. Va. 1983).
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principle and makes it clear that economic impact is not merely part of
a balancing process, but is sufficient in its own right to determine the
outcome of a takings claim.4"3
The argument for a per se or categorical approach in total taking
cases is a persuasive one. The essential meaning of the Takings Clause
is that the rights of individuals should not be sacrificed to promote a
benefit to the general public.48" Although wetlands are a critical envi-
ronmental resource and it is highly desirable that they be protected
against further destruction, the burden of achieving this objective
should not fall solely on the shoulders of a few property owners. Un-
fortunately, governmental agencies, in their desire to protect the envi-
ronment, are sometimes tempted to ignore this principle. To the extent
that the categorical rule in Lucas prevents oppressive government
interference with property rights, it is fully consistent with the spirit
and intent of the Takings Clause.
Another rationale for the Takings Clause is that it promotes eco-
nomic efficiency by requiring governmental entities to internalize the
costs of their regulatory activities instead of shifting them to individual
property owners.' Without some economic accountability, govern-
ments may impose restrictions on property owners that achieve little,
if any, public benefit.486 In theory, the substantive due process require-
483. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2892-95.
484. See Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 372, 401 (1986) ("In its literal reading, it [the Takings Clause] expresses a principle which
denies the legitimacy of individual sacrifice to achieve the greater good."); Glen E. Summers. Com-
ment, Private Property Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substan-
tive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 837, 875-76 (1993) (stating most fundamental concern embod-
ied in Takings Clause is that government not advance public interests at the expense of particular
individuals and minorities).
485. See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 259, 274-75 (1992) ("By making legislators put their money where their mouths are, the
public use and compensation requirements force legislators to act responsibly in appropriating private
property . . . ."); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 44
("The [Takings] Clause forces the government officials to put their money where their mouth is
when they assert that certain social gains are worth the private costs that they impose."); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1706 (1988)
("The compensation requirement can be understoud as a way to force public policymakers to consider
the opportunity costs of their proposed actions.").
486. This theory, known as fiscal illusion, assumes that legislatures and agencies will underval-
ue private property that is affected by government projects or regulations. See Lawrence Blume &
Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 621
(1984) ("Fiscal illusion arises because the costs of governmental actions are generally discounted by
the decisionmaking body unless they explicitly appear as a budgetary expense."); Robert I. McMurry,
Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in Chal-
lenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711, 731 (1982) ("Government entities have little
financial incentive to seek the most efficient means to achieve public goals when they know they will
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ment imposes some restraint on inefficient government regulation.i7
However, courts traditionally accord a great deal of deference in due
process cases to legislative judgments regarding regulatory means and
ends.4"" Therefore, the Lucas Court's categorical rule is necessary to
provide protection against "inefficient" regulations by making govern-
ments compensate landowners for the costs of such regulations.
Finally, the Lucas Court has made it clear that its categorical rule
protects the commercial or developmental value of property.489 Although
landowners are not entitled to make the "highest and best" use of their
land,4" Lucas at least ensures that they will not be required to leave their
land in a wholly unproductive state.49 This makes sense if one assumes
that an essential aspect of property ownership is "the right to make some
money from it." 4" Consequently, residual uses, such as wildlife preserva-
tion or maintenance of water quality, which have no pecuniary value to
private landowners, should not be considered "economically beneficial
uses" for purposes of a takings analysis. This also means that Lucas is
inconsistent with the reasoning of Just v. Marinette County 493 and other
not be forced to pay for even the most excessive regulations."); but see Douglas T. Kendall, Note,
The Limits to Growth and the Limits to the Takings Clause, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 547, 584 (1992)
(questioning whether a compensation requirement provides a check on arbitrary or unwise legislative
action); Note, Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to Regulation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 914,
923-24 (1993) (disputing the validity of the "fiscal illusion" theory).
487. A substantive due process analysis involves a consideration of two factors: (1) whether the
regulation advances any valid governmental interest; and (2) whether the means chosen provide a
rational method for achieving the regulation's objectives. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894) ("To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re-
quire such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.").
488. See Humbach, supra note 201, at 271. ("[l1t is well accepted that substantive due process
standards do not place particularly stringent limitations on the government's power to act upon or
regulate economic interests."); Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding
Takings Jurisprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 433, 447 (1988) ("Un-
til recently, governments could expect courts to defer to their judgment on the means chosen to
achieve their end, as well as on their choice of end.").
489. See Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions of Rela-
tivity, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 629, 634 ("The Supreme Court's opinion in the 1992 decision Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council provides clear evidence of the law's continuing support for a
landowner's exploitive tendencies."); Sanderson & Mesmer, supra note 159, at 505 (1993) ("value"
means developmental value to the Lucas Court).
490. See Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Deltona Corp. v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
491. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 ("We think ... that when the owner of real property has been
called upon ... to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.").
492. See Rubenfeld, supra note 158, at 1106. See also, Matthew B. Smith, Note, Defining
Property in the Post-Lucas World, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 443, 456-57 (contrasting the "self-regarding"
concept of property rights with the "communitarian" view).
493. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
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cases494 that concluded that property owners have no inherent right to
change the "natural" character of their land.49 Although no court has
directly addressed this issue, the holdings in Florida Rock and Loveladies
Harbor strongly suggest that the government cannot restrict property to its
natural condition without running afoul of the categorical rule. 96
Although the categorical rule is a welcome addition to takings law,
the Lucas Court left unanswered questions about how the rule would
apply in actual cases. One question is whether a regulation must destroy
all market value before a landowner is eligible for compensation under the
categorical rule. The results in Florida Rock and Loveladies Harbor sug-
gest a negative answer to this question. In Florida Rock, the claims court
excluded evidence of any possible speculative value the property might
have and concluded that it had a residual value of not more than $500 an
acre as a government-owned recreational or water management site.4 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that "fair market value"
included speculative value if there was in fact a market for the proper-
ty.49 The court of appeals in Florida Rock assumed that the speculative
value of the landowner's property exceeded the claims court's estimate; 499
however, it left open the question of whether a residual value of $500 an
acre was low enough to constitute a total taking under the categorical rule
of Lucas." This suggests that property need not be literally worthless to
come within the purview of the categorical rule.
Likewise, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,5 'O the same
court of appeals upheld a claims court decision in favor of a landowner
whose 12.5-acre tract of property allegedly fell in value from $2,658,000
to $12,500 as a result of a permit denial."° Thus, in the court's view,
Lucas' categorical rule was applicable even though the claimant's proper-
494. Id. at 768; see also Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 Su.2d 1374, 1382 (Fla.
1981), cert. denied sub noma. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d
239, 243 (N.H. 1975); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984).
495. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95 ("[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without econom-
ically beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.").
496. Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 167 (1990), rev'd, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cit. 1994);
Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158-59 (1990).
497. Florida Rock, 21 Cl Ct. at 175. See also, Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158 (1990)
(birdwatching, hunting and harvesting of salt hay deemed to be economically impractical).
498. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1567-68.
499. Id. at 1566.
500. Id. at 1572-73.
501. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
502. Id. at 1174-75.
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ty was still worth $1,000 an acre. °3 The court's interpretation of the
categorical rule in Florida Rock and Loveladies Harbor seems completely
justifiable. Since every piece of property will have some value no matter
how strictly it is regulated,5" the goals of the Lucas Court would be
frustrated if courts insisted that property be rendered completely valueless
or unmarketable as a prerequisite for applying the categorical rule. It
must be conceded, however, that an element of subjectivity is inevitably
introduced when a court is allowed to apply the categorical rule to land-
owners whose property has some market value.
B. Abolition of Traditional "No Compensation" Rules
The categorical total takings rule of Lucas effectively abolishes the
noxious use rule and the harm/benefit rule, two doctrines that courts have
relied upon for years to deny compensation to landowners whose property
values have been destroyed by highly restrictive governmental regulations.5
1. The Noxious Use Rule
The Lucas Court expressly repudiated the traditional noxious use
rule.5" Under the noxious use rule, activities that created a risk of signifi-
cant harm to the public could be prohibited regardless of the regulation's
economic effect on the regulated parties.' The justification usually given
503. Id. at 1180-83.
504. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 167 (1985) ("Common sense
suggests that regulatory action will never entirely eliminate the market value of the real property it affects.").
505. See Ausness, supra note 5, at 463-64.
506. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 ("[I]t becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve
as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory "takings"-which require compensation-from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation.").
507. See Michael J. Quinlan, supra note 5, at 176. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887),
is thought to be the origin of the noxious use test. See Thomas P. Glass, Comment, Property Law: Takings
and the Nuisance Exception in the Aftermath of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 18 DAYrON L.
REv. 509, 513 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has often relied on the noxious use rule to uphold
severe restrictions on the use of property. See, e.g., Miller v. Schone, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding
law which required destruction of cedar trees infected with cedar rust parasites); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267
U.S. 188, 195-96 (1925) (upholding law prohibiting possession in plaintiff's home of alcoholic beverages
purchased before passage of state prohibition law); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 499
(1919) (upholding ban on oil and gasoline storage tanks near residential dwellings); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915) (upholding prohibition of brickyard in residential area); Reitunan v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177 (1915) (upholding ban on livery stables in residential ama); Murphy v.
California, 225 U.S. 623, 629 (1912) (upholding ordinance against pool hails); L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177
U.S. 587, 598 (1900) (upholding ban on houses of prostitution in certain areas); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (upholding closure of plaintiff's brewery). It should be noted that the Supreme
Court in Keystone included the noxious use concept as part of the "character of government" element in its
balancing test. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1987). See
also Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part f-A Critique of
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for the denial of compensation is that no one can obtain a vested right to
injure or endanger the public." 8 The noxious use rule would be unobjec-
tionable if it were strictly limited to obvious nuisances,"° but over the
years the rule has been expanded beyond common-law nuisance situa-
tions. This has encouraged some courts to arbitrarily classify normal
land use activities as "noxious" in order to foreclose serious consideration
of takings claims."1' Even prior to Lucas, federal courts in Formanek and
Florida Rock rejected arguments against compensation based on the nox-
ious use rule.512 The Lucas Court has settled this issue once and for all by
replacing the noxious use rule with a narrower "nuisance exception." s"3
2. The Harm/Benefit Rule
Lucas also implicitly rejects the harm/benefit rule. The harm/benefit
rule is a derivation of the noxious use rule."14 It provides that no taking
occurs if a regulation merely prevents property owners from causing harm
to others, although compensation will be required if the purpose of the
regulation is to confer a benefit on the public that it does not currently
enjoy. 15 Under this approach, no compensation is required even when the
Current Takings Clase Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1329 (1989) (Keystone Court interpreted first part
of Agins test to include an inquiry into whether the government was seeking to prevent a noxious use).
508. See Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330 (1905); New Orleans Gas Light Co. v.
Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905). See also Laura McKnight, Regulatory Takings: Sort-
ing Out Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 41 U. KAN. L.
REv. 615, 632 (1993) (if the common law prohibits noxious uses of property, a legislature does not
take any property right away from the owner when it regulates such uses).
509. See Peterson, supra note 508, at 86 (suggesting that the noxious use rule should be applied
only when the public would regard the regulated activity as "wrongful").
510. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 234 (1988) ("Mhe scope of the
[noxious use] doctrine historically has been extended beyond simple nuisance prevention."); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 485, at 1709 ("In practice, however, [when applying the noxious use rule]
courts do not seem to limit themselves to common-law nuisances.").
511. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenectictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490-92 (1987) (sug-
gesting that mining operations that harmed surface owners were similar to noxious uses).
512. See Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 340 (1992); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 8 CI. Ct. 160, 169-71 (1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 893, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also
Florida Rock Indus, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 167 (1990).
513. See Washburn, supra note 480, at 196 (the nuisance exception in Lucas is much narrower than
the traditional noxious use test); bit cf. Lazarus, supra note 481, at 1426 ("The Court engaged in a shell
game by pointedly rejecting a 'noxious' or 'harmful use' exception to the Takings Clause, only to adopt its
analytical equivalent dubbed 'background principles of nuisance and property law.'"). But see Babcock,
supra note 481, at 4 ("[T]he Supreme Court has conceptually expanded the 'harmful' or 'noxious use'
principle of takings jurisprudence, giving the princpal new vitality.").
514. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48 (1964) (the
harm/benefit test is a modem version of the noxious use rule).
515. See Michelman, supra note 166, at 1196 ("The idea [of the harm/benefit rule] is that com-
pensation is required when the public helps itself to good at private expense, but not when the public
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regulation allows no profitable use of the property.5 1 6 While there may be
a meaningful difference in theory between preventing a harm and securing
a future benefit on behalf of the public, 7 it is difficult to maintain this
distinction in practice.5 1 8  Nevertheless, the inherent ambiguity of the
harm/benefit rule enabled some courts in the past to uphold burdensome
restrictions on development under the guise of preventing harm to the
public." 9 Hopefully, the Lucas decision will discourage any further reli-
ance on the harm/benefit test in regulatory takings cases.
C. The Nuisance Exception
According to the Lucas Court, when the government deprives a
landowner of all economically beneficial use, it can avoid the duty to
compensate only by showing that the interest destroyed by the regulation
was not part of the landowner's title."2 This is known as the "nuisance
exception" to the categorical rule.52" ' At first blush, the Lucas court's
nuisance exception appears to be nothing more than a reincarnation of the
old noxious use rule. However, the nuisance exception is narrower than
the noxious use rule." Furthermore, unlike the noxious use rule, which
was an exception to any takings claim, the nuisance exception is only an
exception to the categorical rule in total takings cases. 5"
There are two parts to the nuisance exception: First, the government
will not be required to compensate a landowner if the prohibited use was
not part of the landowner's original title at the time of purchase."a Thus,
simply requires one of its members to stop making a nuisance of himself.").
516. See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of
the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENV'L. L. REV. 311, 324 (1988).
517. .See Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
650, 665-66 (1958).
518. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 ("The distinction between 'barm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring'
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder."). See also Connors, supra note 186, at 184; Glynn S.
LunIney, Jr., A Critical Examination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1933-35 (1992).
519. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis. 1972). It is interesting to note that both the claims court
and the Court of Appeals in Florida Rock concluded that wetland preservation measures did not prevent a
harm, but were intended to obtain a public benefit. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct.
160, 176-77 (1985), aft'd, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also Blumn & Zaleha, supra note 65,
756-57 (criticizing the claims court's use and misuse of the harmbenefit test in Florida Rock).
520. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with.").
521. Id. at 2920-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
522. See Washburn, supra note 480, at 196.
523. See Laitos, supra note 200, at 309.
524. See Palzer, supra note 480, at 547.
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such concepts as the public trust doctrine may limit a landowner's rights
in wetland property.5 Second, compensation will be denied when the
regulation duplicates a result that could have been achieved through the
application of common-law nuisance principles."
Furthermore, the Lucas Court took steps to ensure that the nuisance
exception does not swallow up the categorical rule. First, the Court has
placed the burden of proof on the government to establish that the nuisance
exception applies to a takings claim. 27 Second, the Court has specified that
legislatures cannot not bring an activity within the nuisance exception simply
by declaring it to be a nuisance. 5" Thus, in order for the nuisance exception
to apply, the activity in question must be prohibited by existing common-law
principles of property or nuisance law. Some commentators have criticized
this aspect of the nuisance exception because it vests courts with control over
matters which are best left to legislatures. 29 However, legislatures are unlike-
ly to be either knowledgeable or objective about principles of property or
nuisance law.530 Courts, on the other hand, have expertise in dealing with
complex legal doctrines and are more likely to act as impartial decisionmakers.53t
525. See Babcock, supra note 481, at 37-38 (stating government regulators may rely on the
public trust doctrine to justify their actions under the Lucas takings rule); MceCurdy, supra note 49, at
711-15 (arguing that the public trust doctrine ought to protect wetlands from destructive activities by
landowners); Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine
on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 586 (1994) (suggesting non-compensable regulation of
wetlands, even after Lucas, may be justifiable under the public trust doctrine).
526. See Kadlecek, supra note 198, at 430-31 (Lucas indicates that the nuisance exception will
only apply to common-law nuisances).
527. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-02. See also Delaney, supra note 480, at 402; James B. Wadley
& Pamela Falk, Lucas and Environmental Land Use Controls in Rural Areas: Whose Land Is It Any-
way?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 331, 349 (1993).
528. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 ("Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.").
529. See Cotton C. Harness, III, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Its Historical Con-
text and Shifting Constitutional Principles, 10 PACE ENVrL. L. REV. 5, 19 (1993) (narrowing legislative
discretion will chill its ability to respond to evolving problems); John A. Humbach, "Taking" the
Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judg-
ments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771, 772 (1993) ("What the Supreme Court did in Lucas itself was to
reassign flat-out a portion of this nation's ultimate environmental and land use authority from the
legislatures, which traditionally had it, to the courts."); Laitos, supra note 200, at 310 ("Lucas leaves
open the very real possibility of a court having to make subjective judgments when it identifies the
background principles of nuisance law that will be applied to any given case."); Cook, supra note 6,
at 1440 ("The Court's per se rule in this area is flawed because it . may prohibit legislatures from
passing needed regulations in the future.").
530. See Washburn, supra note 480, at 197 (to allow a governmental entity to determine the
parameters of its own liability would deprive the Takings Clause of its protective purpose); Levitt,
supra note 188, at 211-12 (determination as to whether a law regulates a nuisance cannot safely be
left entirely to state legislatures).
531. See Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1413
(1991) (courts are less likely than legislatures to initiate self-interested steps that deprive owners of
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It remains to be seen whether courts will invoke the nuisance excep-
tion in order to uphold highly restrictive wetland regulations. At least one
commentator has contended that dredge and fill operations in wetlands
should automatically fall within the nuisance exception.532 In Loveladies
Harbor,533 however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit conclud-
ed that the nuisance exception was not applicable and allowed the land-
owner to recover under the categorical rule.534
D. The Nonsegmentation Rule
To ascertain whether a regulation has deprived a landowner of all
economically beneficial use, a court must first identify the "property"
that will be examined in its takings analysis. Obviously, the breadth of
this definition will often determine whether the regulation is deemed to
be a taking or not.535 Delimitation of the relevant piece of property is
especially important in wetlands regulation because often only part of
the original parcel will be directly affected by the Corps' permitting
requirements. 536
In the past, most courts have looked at the entire physical tract when
evaluating the economic impact of a governmental regulation upon a piece
of property.537 Under this approach, a regulation may validly prohibit all
development on a portion of the land as long as the rest of the land can
be put to beneficial use.538 This is known as the nonsegmentation or the
"parcel as a whole" doctrine. Prior to Lucas, courts often applied this
control over their resources); but see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:
A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 316-18 (1993) (state
courts may manipulate principles of property or nuisance law).
532. See Scarlott, supra note 65, at 921 ("Where the government exercises its authority under
the Clean Water Act to prevent landowners from destroying wetlands, the public nuisance exception
should insulate the government from taking claims by those landowners.").
533. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
534. Id. at 1182-83.
535. Fisher, supra note 6, at 1402.
536. Kennedy, supra note 161, at 730.
537. Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings After Lucas: Growth Management,
Planning, and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better Than Before, 22 STETSON L. REV. 409,
420-21 (1993); Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act, Section 404 Permitting, and the Tak-
ings Clause, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 916-17 (1989).
538. Kadlecek, supra note 198, at 423. This same principle provides that discrete "interests" in
property should not be evaluated separately for purposes of a takings analysis. See Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated."); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("Where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property fights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.").
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principle to defeat takings claims by owners of wetland property. 39 Many
commentators maintain that the nonsegmentation rule is an essential corol-
lary to the Court's categorical total takings rule." They argue a court
may even consider property that has been sold prior to a permit applica-
tion in its takings analysis; otherwise, they contend, the government will
be required to compensate landowners who have fully recouped their orig-
inal investment.54 ' Furthermore, without a nonsegmentation rule, land-
owners may artificially segment their holdings in order to qualify for
compensation under the categorical rule. 42
Lucas did not explicitly address the segmentation issue because
Lucas's entire tract was affected by the construction setback line. 3 How-
ever, one can argue that Lucas requires courts to focus solely on the
property being regulated and to ignore any unregulated property the
plaintiff might also own. 5" This position is supported by an analogy to
the physical takings rule, whereby compensation is required if even a
small portion of property is occupied, regardless of whether the landown-
er owns other property that is not occupied. 45 Since the Lucas Court
treated deprivation of all economic value as equivalent to a physical occu-
pation, this suggests that the government should pay for property that is
totally devalued by a regulation even if some other portion of the property
is unaffected by the government's action.
Recent cases, however, have retained the nonsegmentation rule.
For example, in Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,547 the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals invoked the rule to rebut a temporary takings
claim by a landowner whose permit was delayed for three years. The
court declared that no taking had occurred because the landowner had
continued to develop other lots in the subdivision during the time its
539. See, e.g., Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Deltona Corp. v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 320
(1991); but see Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904-05 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(confining takings to 98 acres of 1560-acre tract affected by permit denial because Corps indicated
that it would deny permits for remaining acreage as well).
540. Humbach, supra note 529, at 807.
541. ld. at 801.
542. Goldman-Carter, supra note 7, at 434. See also Rubenfeld, supra note 158, at 1107 ("Be-
cause of the parceling problem, the smaller your parcel of rights, the better off you are under the "to-
tal taking" approach affirmed in Lucas.").
543. Washburn, supra note 480, at 203.
544. Sanderson & Mesmer, supra note 159, at 506-07 ("Physical invasions are compensated
even though a potentially small pan of one's property might be taken. Thus, partial takings should be
compensated no matter how small.").
545. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
546. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
547. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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permit application was delayed. 48 On the other hand, in Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit rejected the government's claim that it should consider the
value of the plaintiff's original 250-acre tract instead of just the 12.5-
acre tract directly affected by the permit denial.549 After analyzing a
number of factors, however, the court decided to consider only the
12.5-acre tract for purposes of its total takings inquiry.5 '
E. The Ripeness Issue
Between the time that Lucas brought suit and the time that his case
was decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the legislature amend-
ed the Beachfront Management Act to create a special permit procedure
under which the landowner could request the Coastal Council to allow
construction seaward to the setback line.5"' Consequently, the U.S. Su-
preme Court could have concluded that the Coastal Council had not made
a "final and authoritative determination" with respect to Lucas because it
had not denied his application for a special permit.' Instead, the Court
declared that it would treat the case as a temporary takings claim for loss
of use of the property between 1988 and 1990."'3
It is surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court did not rely on the
ripeness requirement to avoid a decision on the landowner's takings
claim in Lucas. Perhaps, as Justice Blackmun speculated, the court
simply wanted to decide Lucas's takings claim on its merits.554 Another
possibility is that the court felt that it would be unfair to require
Lucas, who had already litigated his claim in three courts, to go
through additional administrative proceedings and litigation before his
case was finally resolved.555 If this latter theory is correct, the Court's
action in Lucas may stand as an invitation to the lower courts to reject
ripeness arguments when the facts indicate that further permit applica-
tions to the regulatory agency are likely to be futile.
The ripeness issue has not arisen in the federal courts since the
Lucas case was decided. A Pennsylvania court relied on a ripeness
548. Id. at 802.
549. 28 F.3d 1171, at 1180-82.
550. Id.
551. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
552. See, e.g., MacDonald, Somer & Frates v. Yoio County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986); Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985).
553. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
554. Id. at 2909.
555. Ausness, supra note 5, at 461-62.
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argument to avoid the effect of the Lucas Court's categorical total
takings rule in Mock v. Department of Natural Resources.s6 However,
the evidence in that case indicated that the regulatory agency was
genuinely prepared to consider a new permit application from the
landowners.557 Thus, it remains to be seen whether the Lucas opinion
will have any effect on the way courts deal with ripeness arguments in
wetlands cases.
F. "Partial" Takings
Because the state tacitly conceded that its coastal construction set-
back regulation deprived the landowner of all economically beneficial
use of his land, the Lucas Court did not set forth a rule to deal with
regulations that deprived a landowner of some, but not all, economi-
cally beneficial use.'5 8 However, the Court did suggest that courts
might resolve a "partial takings" claim in such a case by applying the
Penn Central balancing test." 9
The "partial takings" issue arose recently in Florida Rock Indus-
tries, Inc. v. United States ," where the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered whether partial deprivations of beneficial use could
ever be compensable. The court had reversed a judgment in favor of
the landowner because it determined that the claims court had not
calculated the property's residual fair market value correctly.56' Re-
manding the case to the claims court for further proceedings, the court
of appeals encouraged the lower court to consider the landowner's
claim for a "partial taking" if it found that the categorical rule of
Lucas did not apply.562 The court acknowledged the difficulty of deter-
mining when a regulation "goes too far," and declared that the deci-
sion on this issue would involve a "classic exercise of judicial balanc-
556. 623 A,2d 940 (Pa. 1993).
557. Id. at 947.
558. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896.
559. Id. at 2895 n.8 ([A]n owner [whose property is diminished in value by less than 100 per-
cent] might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowl-
edged time and again, '[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and ... the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant
to takings analysis generally."). See also Freilich & Garvin, supra note 537, at 419 ('If the land-
owner is left with some value of the property, the inquiry will return to the balancing of interests.");
Summers. supra note 484, at 883 ("The opinion [Lucas] posits that when the two per se rules are not
applicable to the case at bar, the Court will return to 'case specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint.").
560. 18 Fed. 3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
561. Id. at 1567.
562. Id. at 1570.
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ing of competing values."563 The court of appeals, however, did sug-
gest that the claims court take into account such factors as reciprocity
of advantage, the purpose and function of the regulation, and the
regulation's economic impact on the landowner.56 The court of appeals
subsequently revisited the partial takings issue in Loveladies Harbor
and reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that a landowner could recover
without proving deprivation of all economically beneficial use.565
CONCLUSION
One can view the Lucas decision from a number of perspectives.
In one sense, it reflects the Court's desire to make takings law more
principled by introducing additional "bright line" rules." Regrettably,
this effort is probably doomed to failure because the takings issue is
simply too complex to be reduced to a series of fixed rules. Even such
seemingly straightforward concepts as "deprivation of all economically
beneficial use" and "background principles of nuisance and property
law" will probably turn out to be difficult to apply in the context of
actual controversies.
Lucas can also be viewed as an example of the Court's increasing
willingness to protect property owners against oppressive government
regulation. 67 However, the rhetoric in Lucas promises more than its
holding actually delivers. The categorical rule is too restrictive to help
property owners much and the nuisance exception narrows the rule's
reach even further. For this reason, Lucas does not radically change
563. Id.
564. Id. at 1570-71. Judge Nies, in a lengthy and passionate dissent, questioned the majority's
partial takings theory. Id. at 1573-81 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). However, Judge Nies' primary concern
seemed to be that the various interests in the land, such as mining rights, might be singled out for
separate treatment under a total takings analysis. Id. at 1578-79. Thus, the disagreement between the
majority and the dissenting judges in Florida Rock may really have simply been a matter of semantics
rather than one of substance.
565. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court
did not pursue this issue further since it held that the regulation resulted in a total taking under the
Lucas categorical rule. Id.
566. Summers, supra note 484, at 879 (Lucas represents an attempt, reflected first in Loretto,
458 U.S. 419, "to reduce the necessity for ad hoc determinations by establishing categorical rules
delineating situations in which a per se taking has occurred.").
567. Ausness, supra note 5, at 467-68 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas is the most recent holding
in a line of Supreme Court cases upholding property rights against burdensome government regula-
tions). See also James S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Crit-
ters-Is It Against Nature to Pay for a Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309, 313 (1992) ("In
recent years, the Supreme Court has shown an increased solicitude towards the preservation of private
property rights.").
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existing takings doctrine, nor will it have any direct and immediate impact
on wetland-related takings claims.
However, Lucas may also be viewed as a signal to other courts
that it is necessary to curb burdensome environmental regulations."s If
this is so, it does not seem to have had much impact at the state level.
Federal courts, on the other hand, may respond more positively to the
Lucas Court's anti-regulatory message. In particular, the claims court,
which has often been receptive to takings claims in the past,569 may be
persuaded by the rhetoric of Lucas that it is permissible to broaden the
protection afforded landowners by the Takings Clause. So far, how-
ever, this tendency has been checked by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which tends to be a bit less sympathetic to property
owners than the claims court. 70
It remains to be seen what impact, if any, the Lucas decision will
have on wetland protection regulation. Although Lucas provides some
additional protection to property owners, it does not represent a major
change in takings jurisprudence. Consequently, Lucas is unlikely to sig-
nificantly affect the administration of existing wetland protection schemes.
568. Lazarus, supra note 481, at 1413 (Supreme Court opinions often signal doctrinal or policy
shifts which lower courts are encouraged to develop and amplify).
569. Hanley. supra note 10, at 348.
570. But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming a
decision by the claims court that denial of a dredge and fill permit constituted a regulatory taking).
Vol. XXX
